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ABSTRACT
Oyster production in Virginia has declined dramatically 
in the past ten years, causing Virginia oyster processors to 
rely increasingly on oyster supplies from other regions. In 
response to the industry problems, the Virginia Marine 
Resources Commission (VMRC) developed and began implementing 
an Oyster Fishery Management Plan (OFMP) in 1985.
Primarily, the plan seeks to increase Virginia oyster 
production from both public and leased grounds. A large 
increase in production could significantly affect the oyster 
market.
There is thus a need to understand the Virginia oyster 
market, which derives raw material supplies primarily from 
public and leased-grounds production and from other states. 
Although the level of competition among the three sources is 
uncertain, it is thought to be substantial and quite 
important for the success of the OFMP. This study assesses 
the level of competition and associated sector interaction.
A simultaneous equation system is specified and estimated by 
Full-Information-Maximum-Likelihood procedure. Estimates 
and a market simulation model are used to assess the impact 
of the OFMP on market behavior.
Analyses indicate that the market for the public ground 
fishery consists of an elastic demand and an inelastic 
supply, but the market for private oyster cultivation 
consists of an inelastic demand and an elastic supply. The 
market interaction between the eastern oyster and Pacific 
oyster is weak. Oysters from leased grounds compete with 
supplies from other regions and with Pacific oysters.
Market simulations indicate that the OFMP will increase 
total revenue for both public and private producers, 
suggesting that (1) the seasonal closure on commercial 
oyster fishery may be extended as stock size recovers, (2) 
increasing private production may reduce oyster supplies 
from other states, and (3) from the market interaction point 
of view, the Pacific oyster may be an alternative for 
private oyster planters.
x
MARKET INTERACTIONS AND COMPETITION BETWEEN PUBLIC AND 
PRIVATE OYSTER PRODUCTION AND SUPPLIES FROM OTHER STATES
INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
introduction
The oyster fishery was once one of the more important 
fisheries in Virginia. Annual production of the eastern 
oyster (Crassostrea virglnica) was over five million bushels 
between 1890 and 1925 (Haven et al., 1981), but due to 
overexploitation, oyster production fell to 2.5 million 
bushels from 1926 through the late 1950's (Insley, 1986). 
Oyster production further declined from the presence of MSX 
(Haplosporidium nelsoni) and "Dermo" (Perkinsus marinus), 
and in 1991, annual oyster production dropped to 0.2 million 
bushels (VMRC, 1992).
Prior research has suggested that the large decline in 
oyster production may result from several factors. The 
outbreak of MSX in 1959 reduced private oyster production 
initially, and its persistence, combined with "Dermo," has 
continued to discourage private oyster planting (Bosch and 
Shabman, 1989; Hargis and Haven, 1988a; Haven and Whitcomb,
1986). Overfishing is the most important factor affecting 
the production of public ground fisheries (Hargis and Haven,
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1988a; Haven et al., 1981). Other factors such as 
inadequate oyster management policy, degradation of 
environmental quality, reduction in spatfall, high costs of 
production, and market competition from Gulf and west coast 
states also resulted in production decline (CEC, 1989;
Hargis and Haven, 1988b; Haven et al., 1981; JLARC, 1984; 
Haven and Fritz, 1986; Haven and Whitcomb, 1986; Insley, 
1986; Thunberg, 198 6).
In response to industry and resource problems, the 
Virginia Marine Resources Commission (VMRC) developed and 
began implementing an Oyster Fishery Management Plan (OFMP) 
in 1985. Primarily, the plan seeks to increase Virginia 
oyster production from both public and private leased 
grounds and to maximize biological, sociological, and 
economic benefits with available resources (Bosch and 
Shabman, 1988; Insley, 1986).
Success of the oyster management strategy, however, 
requires an understanding not only of oyster production but 
also of the market's effect on the goals established to 
benefit the oyster industry. As total Virginia production 
declines, the demand for Virginia oysters is affected by 
insufficient supplies; thus, Virginia oyster processors have 
had to rely increasingly on oyster supplies from other 
regions. For instance, supplies from other states were
negligible before the outbreak of MSX in 1959, but over half 
of the oysters shucked in Virginia now come from Maryland 
and the Gulf states (VMRC, 1989). Unfortunately, little 
information is available on the current Virginia oyster 
market or on the market relationships between public ground 
fishery, private oyster cultivation, and oyster supplies 
from other regions.
Objectives
Since the success of management strategies requires an 
understanding of the market conflicts between the public 
ground fishery, private cultivation, and oyster supplies 
from other regions, several important questions must be 
addressed. What are the market relationships between public 
and private leased grounds and supplies from other states?
If the goals of the oyster management plan are reached, what 
will be the impact of the plan on the Virginia oyster 
market? What is the effect of private oyster production on 
oyster supplies from other regions? What is the market 
relationship between the native Virginia oysters and Pacific 
oysters —  will Pacific oysters compete with native oysters 
in the Virginia shellstock market?
This study analyzes the interrelationships between
public ground fishery, private cultivation, and oyster 
supplies from other regions, using econometric models of 
production and market conditions. A simulation then 
evaluates the oyster fishery management plan's impact on the 
Virginia oyster market. Objectives of this study are as 
follows:
1. To construct an empirical framework of the 
interrelationships of public ground fishery, 
private cultivation, and supplies from other 
regions;
2. To develop modeling specifications for econometric 
analysis, including
(a) the demand for unshucked oysters from public 
grounds, private leased grounds, and supply 
from other regions,
(b) the supply of oysters from public and private 
leased grounds, and
(c) the identities for market equilibrium; and
3. To specify a simulation model for public ground 
fishery, private cultivation, and supplies from 
other regions based on the econometric model.
THE U.S. AND VIRGINIA OYSTER FISHERIES
Introduction
The oyster fishery has been traditionally one of the 
more important fisheries in the world (Borgese, 1980). 
Numerous oyster species are exploited worldwide: among them, 
the eastern oyster {Crassostrea virginica), European flat 
oyster (Ostrea edulis), and Pacific or Japanese oyster 
(Crassostrea gigas) comprise over 80 percent of total 
worldwide oyster production (Table 1). However, oyster 
production is concentrated primarily in a few countries —  
South Korea, Japan, the United States, and France —  which 
account for approximately 8 0 percent of total worldwide 
production (Table 2).
The U.S. Oyster Fisheries
In the United States, two major oyster species have 
been exploited: the eastern oyster on the east coast and 
Gulf region and the Pacific oyster on the west coast. This 
geographic distinction does not imply that other species are 
not utilized on either coast; for instance, the eastern and
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Table 1. Worldwide oyster harvests by species
(metric tons).
O.
edulis
C.
gigas
C.
viginica
Other
Species Total
1978 6426 435,059 325,399 133,993 900,877
1979 7661 422,674 303,750 139,005 873,090
1980 7114 498,716 329,971 135,883 971,684
1981 1,137 487,741 329,469 134,416 961,763
1982 1, 354 488,472 324,768 150,235 973,829
1983 9368 556,709 321,504 153,962 1,041,543
1984 1,344 567,544 303,028 158,364 1,042,280
1985 1,810 614,938 272,604 187,947 1,088,299
1986 15,359 620,297 254,704 192,279 1,082,639
1987 13,267 690,561 229,608 178,684 1,112,120
1988 14,613 707,671 192,401 179,841 1,094,526
1989 17,700 649,327 183,142 192,347 1,042,516
1990 16,168 654,706 148,033 209,747 1,028,654
Sources: FAO Yearbook, Fishery Statistics: 
Catches and Landings, 19 81 - 1990
Table 2. Oyster production by major producing nations
(metric tons).
France Japan S. Korea USA Total
1978 95,304 232,068 158,283 314,383 900 ,877
1979 105,919 205,509 171,118 290,083 873 ,090
1980 109,675 261,323 187,033 314,714 971 ,684
1981 92,984 235,241 206,361 313,637 961 ,763
1982 96,519 250,288 189,204 315,193 973 , 829
1983 109,191 253,247 218,463 307,033 1, 041 ,543
1984 112,445 257,126 211,886 284,260 1, 042 , 280
1985 139,786 251,247 254,515 260,449 1, 088 ,299
1986 146,319 251,574 268,775 234,273 1,082 , 639
1987 138,424 258,776 303,223 217,632 1,112 , 120
1988 137,783 270,858 298,719 167,700 1,094 ,526
1989 146,766 256,313 256,262 158,425 1,042 ,516
1990 153,843 248,793 248900 148,497 1, 028 , 654
Sources: FAO Yearbook, Fishery Statistics: 
Catches and Landings, 1981 - 1990
European oysters are also raised on the west coast but on a 
smaller scale. The European flat oyster, introduced into 
the New England area from Holland in 1949 (Clime and Hamill, 
1979), has been underutilized because of its slow rate of 
growth in cold water. Production of the European oyster is 
relatively small compared to the eastern and Pacific 
oysters.
The Pacific oyster was introduced on the west coast in 
the 1920s after the population of the native Olympia oyster 
(O. lurida) was damaged severely by overfishing (Wiegardt, 
1988), but the water temperature of the west coast was often 
too cold for Pacific oysters to spawn naturally. 
Subsequently, a large number of Pacific seed oysters were 
imported from Japan, because of the undesirable fluctuation 
of natural production of Pacific seed oysters. Until the 
late 1970s, the west coast Pacific oyster production 
depended primarily upon the availability of Pacific seed 
oysters from Japan. As prices of Pacific seed oysters 
increased, the seed supplies from Japan became difficult to 
obtain, and in response, local oyster producers developed 
hatcheries (chew, 1984).
These became very important to west coast oyster 
farmers. A new technique, called remote setting, was 
initiated in 1982 (Chew, 1984). Traditionally, spat and
seed oysters were produced in local hatcheries, but the new 
technique, which allowed many eyed-larvae to be shipped to 
distant areas and had a fairly high success rate for spat 
collection in tanks, promised to produce a large quantity of 
seed oysters in any suitable location. The Pacific oyster, 
produced in hatcheries and then raised on private leased 
grounds now accounts for most west coast oyster production 
(NOAA, 1977; Burrell, 1983).
The eastern oyster is a native oyster found all along 
the coast of the Atlantic Ocean to the Gulf of Mexico 
(Galtsoff, 1964; NMPS, 1977), with the Gulf Coast and the 
Chesapeake Bay the major resource areas. Many states in 
these areas have extensive oyster repletion programs that 
attempt to enhance and maintain stock levels via planting 
oyster shells and seed oysters on state-owned grounds. The 
programs may provide sufficient stock levels for maintaining 
a fishery on public grounds and low cost seed oysters for 
private oyster growers.
Unfortunately, oyster production on the east coast has 
declined dramatically (Fig. 1). The sharp decline in 
eastern oyster production is believed to be associated 
primarily with MSX and "Dermo" diseases and overfishing.
For example, the oyster fishery in Delaware has been closed
Figure 1
The U.S. oyster production, 1977-1990. 
(Source: Fisheries of the United States)
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since 1985 as a result of MSX-related mortalities {Lewis,
1987), and oyster production in Maryland fell to about 0.3 
million bushels in 1988. Similarly, in Virginia, most 
public grounds were no longer producing market oysters, 
except for the James River areas (CEC, 1989, Barber and 
Mann, 1991).
The Virginia Oyster Fisheries
Virginia oysters are harvested from state-managed 
public grounds and private-leased grounds. The Virginia 
legislature has defined that the right to use the natural 
oyster grounds belongs to all citizens of the state.
However, in the past, the lack of a definite boundary for 
natural oyster beds resulted in a conflict between oystermen 
and private planters on the use of state-owned oyster 
grounds (Armstrong, 1879). In 1892, a survey by J.B. Baylor 
divided all the Virginia tidal water areas into two 
categories, within the Baylor survey and outside the Baylor 
survey. The Baylor survey, also called public grounds, 
contains the most naturally productive oyster beds (Fig. 2), 
while the area outside the survey does not produce oysters 
naturally and may be leased to whomever desires to use the 
grounds for oyster cultivation (Richmond News Leader, 193 0).
Figure 2
Virginia shellfish grounds. 
(Reprinted from JLARC, 1984)
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Hand tongs, patent tongs, and dredges are the common 
tools used to harvest oysters (Fig. 3). The number of 
oyster gear licenses varies and may be related to stock 
abundance (Table 3). Additionally, oysters are harvested 
frequently by hand on the seaside of the Eastern Shore 
(Insley, 1986; VMRC, 1989). Once harvested, market oysters 
are sold to shucking or packing houses for further 
processing; seed oysters (larger than one inch) are sold to 
a buy-boat or trucker for transplanting onto private leased 
grounds. The variation of seed production may depend on the 
needs of private planters. Prior to 1980, over 75 percent 
of seed oysters supplied to private planters were from the 
James River (Haven et al., 1981).
The private leased grounds are not naturally productive 
and thus require considerable effort and expense to 
cultivate oysters. Because they do not produce enough seed 
oysters to satisfy the needs of private planters, seed 
oysters must be harvested from public grounds and 
transplanted onto the leased bottoms. The rate of planting 
seed oysters on the leased grounds is 500-1000 bushels per 
acre (Haven et al., 1981).
Frequently, these bottoms are too soft to support
Figure 3
Types of oyster gears. 
(Reprinted from JLARC, 1984)
CATCH PATENT TONGS
OYSTER OREDGE
ROPE
MESHING
DUMP RING
CHAIN LINKS
Table 3. Annual number of oyster gear licenses in Virginia.
Year Hand Patent Dredge
1955 3 234 345 43
1956 3 413 370 30
1957 4 431 388 8
1958 3 879 291 1
1959 4 096 275 50
1960 3 912 247 104
1961 3 214 120 28
1962 2 885 49 5
1963 3 217 48 0
1964 3 098 57 0
1965 3 129 28 0
1966 2 679 24 0
1967 2 309 41 0
1968 2 191 22 0
1969 1 865 20 0
1970 1 540 4 0
1971 1 485 8 0
1972 1 310 5 4
1973 1 376 24 5
1974 1 568 74 11
1975 1 758 95 28
1976 1 711 159 25
1977 1 867 215 41
1978 2 052 284 235
1979 2 189 286 144
1980 1 956 379 160
1981 1 968 436 138
1982 1 942 345 141
1983 1 717 278 94
1984 1 785 423 121
1985 1 403 440 121
1986 1 594 373 131
1987 1 755 225 44
1988 1 524 5 0
1989 1 257 41 0
1990 1 149 60 1
Data source: VMRC
oyster growth, so an initial shell planting should be 
carried out to firm the bottom before transplantation. To 
cover an acre of leased ground one inch deep with shells 
requires over 2 000 bushels of oyster shells (Webster and 
Meritt, 1988). The amount of shells needed to stabilize the 
bottom depends upon the type of the ground and the rate of 
bottom sedimentation. In 1986, approximately 110,000 acres 
outside the Baylor survey were made into private leased 
grounds on a relatively small scale; over 80 percent of 
leases held were less than 20 acres (Haven et al., 1981).
Oyster production from private leased grounds has 
declined drastically from the time prior to the occurrence 
of MSX in 1959, when production from private leased grounds 
comprised most of Virginia's production. By 1990, less than 
40 percent of total production was from private leased 
grounds (Fig. 4) . The continuous decline in production from 
private leased grounds resulted primarily from the 
persistence of MSX and "Dermo,1 as well as from high 
production costs (Bosch and Shabman, 1989; Haven and 
Whitcomb, 1986) . It is believed that less than 10 percent 
of leased grounds are productive (VMRC, 1989) .
Prior to the MSX epidemic, oyster supplies from outside 
Virginia were negligible (VMRC, 1989) , but after total
Figure 4
Virginia oyster production.
(Source: Hargis and Haven, 1988; VMRC, 1991)
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production of Virginia oysters declined sharply, Virginia 
oyster processors were forced to look elsewhere for 
supplies. Currently, over half of the oysters shucked in 
Virginia come from other states (Table 4), primarily from 
Maryland and the Gulf states.
Virginia Oyster Management and Problems
The Baylor grounds set aside for public use are managed 
by VMRC. Small portions of public grounds within the James 
River, Great Wicomico River, Piankatank River, and the 
seaside of the Eastern Shore are designated seed oyster 
areas, where the spat set is intensive but the growth of 
oysters slow. The purpose of the seed areas is to provide 
sufficient seed oysters to the Oyster Repletion Program 
(ORP) and to private oyster planters.
The minimum size for a market oyster is three inches, 
except for oysters taken from the James River seed areas, 
which may be 2.5 inches; however, there are no size limits 
on oysters taken from those seed areas and sold as seed 
oysters. If market oysters are being caught, culling 
consists of returning to the water all empty shells and 
undersized oysters. Market oysters are processed in
Table 4. Virginia oyster production and supplies from 
outside Virginia (VA Bushels).
Year
Maryland1 Gulf2 Others
Total Outside 
Supplies
Virginia
Production
1981 1,340,266 6,987 75,940 1,423,193 959,032
1982 970,303 226,878 10,558 1,207,739 790,400
1983 536,432 352,813 5,965 895,210 631,769
1984 607,672 134 ,983 35,981 778,636 647,967
1985 678,510 139,503 3,066 821,079 678,117
1986 616,611 65,232 31,857 713,700 843,398
1987 271,378 140,595 69,420 481,393 667,446
1988 258,844 139,342 57,877 456,063 398,463
1989 333,637 110,087 35,001 478,725 391,504
Source: VMRC data.
1: Including oysters from Potomac River but landing in VA. 
2: Including Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and 
Texas.
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shucking or packing houses.
Only one type of gear, either hand tong, patent tong, 
or dredge is allowed at one time, but two of the same type 
are permissible at once. Hand tongs are commonly used on 
the public ground fishery, although patent tongs and dredges 
are more efficient thanks to their mechanical assistance. 
However, patent tongs and dredges may damage oyster beds; 
therefore their usage is restricted on certain public 
grounds.
The daily catch limit of market-size oysters is 15 
bushels per person by hand tong or 45 bushels per boat. The 
oyster fishing season is circumscribed by time, fishing 
gear, and area, but in general, oysters may be harvested 
from October l to June l by hand tongs and from November 1 
to March 1 by patent tong and dredge. In addition, Virginia 
prohibits oystering from sunset to sunrise, and on Sunday.
The Virginia Marine Resources Commission also manages 
an Oyster Repletion Program (ORP). The goal of the ORP is 
to provide sufficient seed oysters for VMRC to maintain 
adequate oyster stocks on public grounds (Haven et al.,
1981) ; it also provides sufficient quantities of seed 
oysters at a low price to private oyster growers. The ORP
22
has been used by VMRC since the 1920s to maintain the stocks 
on the public grounds. Primarily, the program spreads 
oyster shells as cultch material in known striking areas for 
spat settlement. Since the occurrence of MSX started in 
1960, transplanting seed oysters to suitable growing areas 
on public grounds has expanded as a disaster-relief program 
to support public ground fishery (Baker et al., 1977).
A program of bagless dredging, was started in 1986 to 
clean the previously planted shells in order to enhance an 
oyster strike (Insley, 1986). The shells are cleansed by 
dragging a bagless crab dredge over the oyster beds, dredge 
serving essentially as a rake with the teeth picking up 
shells on the bottom, while the sediment is carried away 
with the tide or current.
The area outside the Baylor survey may be leased from 
VMRC by private oyster growers for renewable ten-year 
periods. Each lessee may not have more than 3,000 acres 
outside of the Chesapeake Bay area or 500,000 acres within 
the Bay, but aside from that, there are few laws and 
regulations pertaining to harvesting oysters from private 
leased grounds. Limits such as those on market-size oysters 
and harvesting gears are not imposed on private leased 
grounds, and therefore, highly efficient dredges are
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typically employed on private leased grounds. Unlike the 
public grounds fishery, there is no seasonal closure on 
private leased grounds.
In addition to disease and other environmental factors, 
the decline in Virginia oyster production is thought to have 
been caused by inadequate management (Hargis and Haven,
1988). Although limits on size, daily catch amounts, type 
of gear, and seasonal closures have been used to limit the 
harvesting of oysters from public grounds, these 
restrictions may have had little effect on controlling total 
mortality and thus conserving the oyster resource (CEC,
1989).
However, oystermen believe that the decline in oyster 
production from public grounds may not have been caused by 
overfishing, but rather by other factors such as disease and 
environmental degradation. In 1979, oyster production from 
public grounds was about 0.8 million bushels, a level higher 
than any year from 1952 to 1985 (Stagg, 1985). Haven et al. 
(1981) argues that there were three factors responsible for 
the increase in public production in the late 1970s: first, 
a low salinity had persisted since 1972, reducing the impact 
of disease; second, tropical storm Agnes caused a flood in 
1972, wiping out oyster predators and increasing oyster
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survival in later years; and finally, new fishing grounds 
around the Pocomoke-Tangier Sound areas were opened to 
dredges in 1978, increasing public production. In addition 
to Haven's suggestions, two other factors may have been 
responsible for high production in the late 1970s. Massive 
shelling occurred between 1973 and 1976 (Table 5), and large 
seed oyster transplanting took place between 1970 and 1974, 
excepting fiscal year 1972-73. An intensive spatfall in the 
lower James River during these periods might be related to 
the massive shelling (Haven and Fritz, 1986). Second, the 
number of licenses issued in the early 1970s was relatively 
low, thus reducing pressure on the stocks.
However, production and number of licenses may not be 
satisfactory indicators of what proportion of a stock is 
harvested. An alternative indicator —  catch per unit 
effort (CPUE) —  is often used to indicate a relative change 
in stock size (Anthony, 1989). However, fishing effort is 
difficult to determine; thus, calculating CPUE usually 
involves obtaining a proxy measure for effort (Anderson, 
1986), such as the number of licenses. Although, the number 
of oyster licenses does not exactly indicate fishing effort, 
it is the only complete data available from VMRC. Catch per 
unit effort (CPUE) of Virginia oysters is obtained by 
dividing public production by the number of hand tong
Table 5. The number of bushels of seed and
shell planted on the public grounds 
by fiscal year (VMRC).
Fiscal
Year
Seed
Transplanted
Shell1
Planted
1961-62 96450 421871
1962-63 23358 1054819
1963-64 82350 2318379
1964-65 9577 4148702
1965-66 95425 2978088
1966-67 37500 2241563
1967-68 53418 2884580
1968-69 57366 1032944
1969-70 114613 944897
1970-71 129122 1488494
1971-72 114866 946826
1972-73 0 1885718
1973-74 118901 2256007
1974-75 50379 3481727
1975-76 90273 3608737
1976-77 50702 1471791
1977-78 80837 762061
1978-79 33822 1153165
1979-80 65483 1193057
1980-81 61291 1474432
1981-82 12321 1443080
1982-83 33245 1437441
1983-84 11824 1297148
1984-85 26579 1956099
1985-86 42136 1860090
1986-87 111232 1551294
1987-88 155699 1805986
1988-89 204392 1801814
1989-90 186392 1107376
Note:
1 - including reef shell and house shell.
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licenses (Fig. 5). The patent tongs and dredges are not 
considered in the CPUE, since these gears are used primarily 
on private leased grounds and certain limited public 
grounds.
Relatively high CPUEs, associated with a low number of 
licenses and high production, were found between 1978 and 
1980. High production from public grounds was caused partly 
by an increase in dredged production as Haven et al. (1981) 
mentioned (Table 6). However, public production by hand 
tongs also increased in this time period, and thus, the 
level of stock may simply have been high during these 
periods.
Although oyster stocks in the late 1970s were likely to 
recover from the long-run depletion, most CPUEs remained 
low. In general, the phenomenon of overfishing is indicated 
when the level of CPUE is relatively low and interspersed 
with unusual peaks (Anthony, 1989). Generally, high peaks 
are related to good recruitment but not to the success of 
management. VMRC may have been confused by the unusual 
recruitment and ignored the signal of declining stocks.
The oyster CPUE declined quickly as the number of hand 
tongs remained at high levels in the early 1980s. The
Figure 5
The CPUE for Virginia oyster fishery.
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Table 6. Oyster landings from public grounds by gear type.
Year Dredges Hand/Patent Others Total
1973 0 351669 0 351669
1974 6856 478245 0 485101
1975 6783 430179 0 436962
1976 19181 367469 12053 398703
1977 38151 422306 9791 470248
1978 165242 578841 27764 771847
1979 175622 533665 26309 735596
1980 167943 570179 31706 769828
1981 73814 499831 17101 590746
1982 76799 344316 42146 463261
1983 25991 255228 38101 319320
1984 48584 318557 31145 398286
1985 53544 294830 11813 360187
1986 24625 398352 11040 434017
Source: VMRC.
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public ground fishery collapsed from the prevalence of 
disease between 1985 and 1988; public production fell from 
800,000 bushels in 1979 to 60,000 bushels in 1991.
One impediment to production may be oyster bed 
depletion. An oyster bed consists of oysters, shells and 
other cultches. As oysters are taken from a bed, shells and 
cultches are brought up together, meaning the sizes of 
productive beds may be reduced —  a phenomenon identified as 
the 'ground externality' (Agnello and Donnelley, 1976). 
Eventually, if there is no reshelling of the beds, the 
naturally productive beds are reduced or destroyed by the 
public ground fishery. The importance of the ORP is to 
eliminate the ground externality of the fishery.
Haven and Whitcomb (1986) surveyed about 84 percent of 
the total public oyster grounds and found that average 
oyster production of public grounds was low. Only 22 
percent of the total surveyed areas were considered as to 
have a moderate or high potential for oyster productivity in 
which the bottoms consisted of shells or cultches.
Reduction of the productive beds occurs primarily because 
harvest levels exceed replenishment of public beds (Andrews, 
1991), and because with limited resources, the ORP can only 
maintain up to 10 percent of total public grounds (Hargis 
and Haven, 1988). The decrease in the sizes of oyster beds
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indicates that the current management regime of the ORP is 
maintaining the rebuilt beds insufficiently.
Existing oyster laws and regulations, which have 
developed over years and are concerned mainly with managing 
the traditional fisheries, may be inadequate for private 
oyster cultivation. Although there are few limitations on 
harvested oysters from private leased grounds, most 
regulations for private oyster cultivation are associated 
with owners' rights, which may involve the rights of 
navigation, riparian rights, and public right to fishing 
(Theberge and Neikirk, 1987). These laws limit private 
oyster growers from obtaining suitable sites or using other 
culture techniques. For instance, off-bottom cultivation 
cannot be employed in the Virginia waters because it hinders 
the rights of navigation.
JLARC (1984) suggested that Virginia oyster policy 
should be changed to improve oyster production. The 
Agreement Commitment Report from the Chesapeake Executive 
Council (CEC, 1989) concurred, stating that prior oyster 
management was ineffective and that new regulations were 
necessary. In response, VMRC has been developing the Oyster 
Fishery Management Plan (OFMP) to revive the industry (Table 
7). The objectives of the OFMP are to improve long-range
Table 7. The goal and objectives of the Virginia oyster 
fishery management plan.
G o a l :  To ’’achieve and maintain a level of Virginia's
public and private ground oyster stocks, to 
generate the greatest possible biological, 
sociological, and economic benefits from their 
harvest and utilization.”
Objectives:
1. By 1993, to increase public ground production 
to at least 700,000 bushels (20 percent above 
the ten year average). To the greatest 
extent possible, reduce major inter-annual 
fluctuation in public production.
2. To assist private oyster producers in 
ensuring an increase in private oyster ground 
production, to 700,000 bushels (the 
approximate 20-year average) by 1995.
3. Ensure the collection of biological, 
sociological, and economic data, as well as 
fisheries statistics, in order to monitor and 
evaluate the effectiveness of management 
measures.
4. Allow the Marine Resources Commission's 
regulatory authority to impose effective and 
timely management measures.
5. Support water and habitat quality standards 
necessary for natural production. Where 
practical, encourage reclamation of condemned 
oyster grounds through VMRC cooperation with 
the State Water Control Board and other state 
agencies.
Source: VMRC.
production and to achieve optimum yield for public ground 
fishery and private production, based on its limited 
resources. However, production proposed under the OFMP is 
much higher than the current production. The OFMP is, thus, 
likely to affect the Virginia oyster market.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK, ECONOMIC MODEL, AND METHODOLOGY
Market:
The concept of a market is often quite confusing. A 
market may vary in geographic scope and be as limited as a 
building or extended worldwide. A market, the place or 
context in which buyers and sellers buy, sell, or trade 
goods and services, consists of buyers, sellers, and often 
third parties such as brokers. The object of the market may 
be a good, a group of goods, or services. In general, the 
definition of a market depends upon its particular purpose 
{Mansfield, 1985) ; for instance, the meaning of the term 
'oyster market' may represent the entire oyster species, 
with all types of oyster products being traded as a whole 
around the world.
Historically, Virginia has been the nation's largest 
producer of eastern oysters. Oysters harvested from public 
and private leased grounds were processed in Virginia 
shucking houses and shipped primarily to areas outside 
Virginia for further processing or consumption (Richmond 
News Leader, 1930; Wheatley, 1959). The processor's demand
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for oyster shellstock is the derived demand for the Virginia 
oyster, and therefore, this study concerns itself primarily 
with the oyster shellstock in Virginia as the market's 
object.
Since a large quantity of oyster shellstock is from 
other regions, this study proposes that the Virginia oyster 
market consists of three sectors: oysters from public ground 
fishery and private leased grounds in Virginia, and oyster 
supplies from other states. These market sectors will be 
referred to hereafter as public, private, and outside supply 
respectively.
Market Demand and Supply
A market may be characterized by demand and supply 
curves, which indicate the amount of a commodity buyers are 
willing to purchase and sellers are willing to sell at 
various prices. The demand curve of a normal good slopes 
downward and to the right —  a negative slope. A normal 
good is a commodity with a demand related positively to 
income. The negative slope of the demand curve indicates 
that an increase in price will decrease the quantity 
demanded of a commodity (Fig. 6-a). The supply curve is
Figure 6
The demand and supply curves.
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assumed to slope upward and to the right —  a positive 
slope. The positive slope of the supply curve suggests that 
an increase in price will increase the quantity supplied of 
the commodity (Fig. 6-b). The demand and supply curves 
represent the total demand and supply for the commodity at 
various prices and at a particular period of time.
Changes in the demand and supply and changes in the 
quantity demanded and supplied of a commodity must be 
distinguished from one another. A change in the demand or 
supply shifts the demand or supply curve because of a change 
in the relationship between price and quantity demanded or 
supplied, resulting from a change in factors such as the 
number of consumers and producers, consumer preference, 
income, population, prices of related goods, or production 
techniques. A change in the quantity demanded or supplied 
refers to the variations in quantity and price of a 
commodity, given all other factors are held constant. A 
change in the demand or supply will shift the entire curve, 
but a change in the quantity demanded or supplied results 
only in a movement along the curve.
Market Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
The quantities demanded and supplied of a commodity
interact as price and production change. The intersection 
of the demand and supply curves in E is called the market 
equilibrium (Fig. 6-c). Once at market equilibrium E, the 
quantity demanded equals the quantity supplied. In reality, 
the market may not be in equilibrium, because demand may not 
equal supply. However, if there are no outside influences 
preventing prices from being bid up or down, the actual 
price will move toward the equilibrium price, and the market 
will converge at an equilibrium price-quantity combination 
(Ferguson and Maurice, 1974) .
Alternatively, the demand and supply curves may shift 
in response to changes in the number of consumers and 
producers, consumer preference, income, population, prices 
of related goods, or production techniques. As the demand 
or supply curve shifts, the market equilibrium changes. The 
new equilibrium will be established depending upon the new 
intersection of demand and supply curves. For example, a 
market equilibrium is assumed to be at O (Fig. 7). If an 
increase in the demand for a commodity occurs and the supply 
is held constant, the demand curve shifts from D to D,. The 
new market equilibrium is established at point A. If an 
increase in the supply of the commodity occurs and the 
demand is held constant, the supply curve shifts from S to 
Sl( and the new equilibrium is B. If both demand and supply 
of the commodity increase simultaneously, the equilibrium
Figure 7
Shifts in market equilibrium.
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may be established at point C.
The market equilibrium model has been criticized widely 
(Bennassy, 1982; Bockstael, 1982; Doorn, 1975; Lambert.
1988) . If the supply cannot increase immediately, price 
adjustment or movement from one equilibrium to the other may 
take a certain period of time to reach the new equilibrium. 
Also, a commodity's quantity and price may be constrained 
institutionally in many ways. For instance, price ceilings 
and floors, fixed prices, tariffs, or quota restrictions may 
be imposed on a market by government, resulting in the 
market's inability to achieve a competitive market 
equilibrium.
A market disequilibrium occurs when quantity demanded 
does not equal quantity supplied. The assumption of market 
equilibrium may be inappropriate if the demand or supply of 
a commodity changes frequently, market adjustment is very 
slow or impossible, or the movement of the price or quantity 
is restricted. Therefore, a market analysis needs to 
distinguish the characteristics of market equilibrium from 
those of disequilibrium.
Fisher (1983) suggests that the view of equilibrium 
should rest logically on two underlying properties about the 
dynamics of equilibrium. First, the market system must be
convergent, or tending towards the equilibrium. Second, the 
movement or returning to the equilibrium state must take 
place quickly so that the transient process of shifting from 
one equilibrium to the other equilibrium may be ignored.
The requirements of an equilibrium system are thus 
convergence and sufficient speed of the market adjustment 
(Fisher, 1983). Once the market reaches an equilibrium, the 
equilibrium will then persist (Froyen and Greer, 1989).
Equilibrium of Virginia Market
A disequilibrium market system or non-convergent market 
is often caused by constraints imposed by government or 
institutions. The constraints limit the movement of price 
and quantity to achieve the market equilibrium or to reduce 
the speed of the market adjustment (Maddala, 198 6). There 
are several regulations and laws in the Virginia oyster 
industry which may affect the market equilibrium: 
restrictions imposed by VMRC on public ground fishery such 
as gear limitations, daily catch limits, and seasonal 
closures. Patent tongs and dredges are relatively efficient 
compared to hand tongs, but since these gears may damage 
oyster grounds, they have been restricted on certain public 
grounds. However, the number of patent tongs and dredges is 
small compared to hand tongs, and they are used primarily on
the private grounds because of their efficiency (Insley, 
1986). The impact of gear limitations on production from 
public ground fishery may thus seem to be small.
A daily catch limit of 15 bushels per person or 45 
bushels per boat has been imposed by VMRC. Insley (1986) 
estimated that a three-person boat may yield 10 to 3 0 
bushels of market oysters per day in Virginia public 
grounds. A report from the CEC (1989) also suggested that 
the average catch per man-day was lower than the permitted 
daily limits, meaning the daily catch limit probably does 
not affect current production from public grounds.
Finally, the closure of the fishing season may affect 
the oyster production of the public grounds, but the 
seasonal closure limits the market itself rather than the 
market adjustment. As the market is subject to seasonal 
closure, the market for public oysters does not exist. The 
study therefore assumes that the limitations of these 
regulations and laws have little effect on the market 
equilibrium for public oysters.
Alternatively, there are few regulations on taking 
oysters from private leased grounds —  no catch, size, or 
gear limitations, or seasonal closures on private oyster 
production (JLARC, 1984). Oyster supplies from private
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leased grounds may be year-round. Also, few laws and 
regulations exist for delivering oyster shellstock from 
other regions to Virginia, except for the purpose of tax 
collection, VMRC requires that oyster shippers provide a 
shipping document detailing the costs, volume and source 
areas. It is reasonable to assume that each market sector 
tends towards an equilibrium.
Harvesting oysters in public grounds and private leased 
grounds may be daily activities. The harvested market 
oysters are transferred on the same day of their harvest to 
the shucking houses (Insley, 1986). The speed of the market 
adjustment from outside supplies to Virginia shucking houses 
is unclear. However, the shellstock cannot be stored for 
weeks without processing; the use of monthly data in the 
study, therefore, should be sufficient to respond to the 
market adjustment. It is assumed that the market adjustment 
of each sector in response to the change in the price is 
reflected adequately in the monthly data, and that each 
market sector is in equilibrium status.
Elasticity
Elasticity measures percentage changes in quantity or 
price of goods in response to changes in factors affecting
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demand or supply. The value of elasticity does not depend 
on the units in which quantity, price, and other factors are 
measured; rather, it is a dimensionless measure and 
expressed as a relative percentage change. The 
sensitivities of goods to the buyers or sellers and the 
market relationships between goods can be compared through 
the use of elasticities.
Own-price Elasticity
Changes in quantity demanded and supplied depend upon 
changes in the prices of the commodity. The measurement of 
the changes in the relationship between price and production 
of a commodity is called the own-price elasticity of demand 
or supply. The own-price elasticity of demand or supply is 
expressed as:
e = ( a Q / a P )  <P/Q)   (3.1)
where
e is the price elasticity of demand or supply,
Q is the quantity demanded or supplied of a commodity,
P is the price of a commodity, and
a  is the symbol meaning "a change in".
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Given a mathematical relationship between quantity and 
price, a Q/aP is equal to the partial derivative (dQ/dP) of a 
demand or supply function. The own-price elasticity may 
thus be obtained as follows:
e = (3Q/3P) (P/Q)   (3.2)
The own-price elasticity of demand is always negative 
for a normal commodity because of the demand curve's 
downward slope. Conversely, the own-price elasticity of 
supply is positive because of the upward slope of the supply 
curve. The magnitude of the own-price elasticity determines 
the sensitivity of the commodity to the buyers or sellers.
The own-price elasticity of demand also indicates the 
effect of a price change in the total amount spent on a 
commodity. However, the amount of money spent by buyers 
equals the sellers7 revenue: the magnitude of the own-price 
elasticity of demand thus has an important relationship to 
the level of revenue (Table 8). If the quantity demanded is 
sensitive to the price change, or the own-price elasticity 
of demand is greater than one, a small increase in price 
will reduce the total revenue. This is because the 
percentage gain from the price increase is less than the 
percentage lost to the quantity sold. If the quantity
Table 8. The relationship between own-price elasticity and 
total revenue.
Own-price Effect on Total Revenue of:
of Demand Price Increase Price Decrease
Price elastic (|e| > 1) Decrease Increase
Unitary (|ej = 1) No change No change
Price inelastic (|e| < 1) Increase Decrease
Note:
|e| is the absolute value of own-price elasticity
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demanded is not sensitive to the price change, or own-price 
elasticity of demand is less than one, an increase in price 
will increase the total revenue. If the own-price 
elasticity equals one, a change in price will not affect 
total revenue.
Cross-price Elasticity
A shift in the demand curve may be caused by a change 
in other factors. For instance, the demand for a commodity 
may be affected by the prices of other related commodities. 
If two commodities are closely related, it is possible that 
one may substitute for the other. If two commodities serve 
the same purpose and are used together, changes in the 
demand for one good will affect the demand for the other 
good in the same direction. It is also possible that two 
commodities are unrelated to each other, and a change in the 
demand for one good will not affect the demand for the 
other. The measurement of the market relationship of two 
commodities is called the cross-price elasticity of demand, 
defined as a rate of change in the quantity demanded of a 
given commodity associated with a change in the price of 
another commodity. It may be expressed as
=  (AQx/ A P y) (P y /Q x) (3.3)
where
e„y is the coefficient of cross-price elasticity of 
commodity X with respect to a change in the price 
of commodity Y,
Qx is the quantity demanded of X, and
Py is the price of Y.
The coefficient of cross-price elasticity, exy, can be 
negative or positive. If the cross-price elasticity is 
positive, two commodities are substitutes. An increase in 
the price of Y will result in an increase in the demand for 
commodity X. If the cross-price elasticity of demand is 
negative, two commodities are complements. An increase in 
the price of Y will result in a decrease in the demand for 
X. If the cross-price elasticity is close to zero, either 
positive or negative, two commodities may be unrelated to 
each other, and they are independent.
Economic Model for Virginia Oyster Market
Many factors affect the Virginia oyster market: its 
complexity may be illustrated by a simplified economic flow 
chart with price at the center of the market (Fig. 8). For 
instance, the demand for public and private oysters may be
Figure 8
Virginia oyster market flows
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affected by factors such as own price, prices of other 
oysters, wholesale price, seasonal demand, and/or the 
supplies from other regions. Production from public ground 
fishery may be affected by the ex-vessel price, fishing 
season, the success of the ORP, and/or environmental 
conditions such as water temperature and salinity. The 
production from private leased grounds is affected by its 
own price, the quantity of previously planted seed oysters, 
and environmental conditions. The arrows on both ends of 
the line represent market equilibrium.
This study proposes a complete Virginia oyster market 
consisting of eight market relationships, with three demand 
equations for the Virginia oyster market, including public 
and private oysters and oyster supplies from other regions. 
There are two supply equations, including public and private 
oyster production, and finally, there are three 
identifications for each market sector to complete the 
system. All relationships are assumed to be linear.
Demand for Oysters
Since the demand function for the Virginia oyster 
market has not been identified, this study proposes demand 
functions for each market sector as
Public: Q d f  F ( P f ,  F p /  Q j o f  F wh ,  F w a ,  ^ l ) ( 3 . 4 )
Private: 
Outside: 
where
Qdf
Pf
D ,
Qdp
Qdo
QJf
Qjp
P o
Qdp =  F ( P f ,  P p ■ wh > D.) ( 3 . 5 )
Qdo = F(Qsf  / djp I P w . ) ( 3 . 6 )
is the demand for oysters from public grounds, 
is the oyster ex-vessel price or dockside price, 
is the price paid to private planters, 
is the quantity of supply from other regions, 
is the wholesale price index in the Fulton market, 
is the oyster ex-vessel price in the state of 
Washington,
is the seasonal demand dummy variable,
is the demand for oysters from private leased
grounds,
is the demand for oyster supplies from other 
regions,
is the oyster supply from public grounds,
is the oyster supply from private leased grounds,
and
is the composite price index for other states.
The Virginia oyster processors7 demand for oysters from 
public ground fishery and private leased grounds is assumed
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to be affected by the oyster ex-vessel price, price paid to 
private planters, outside supplies, wholesale price index, 
the oyster ex-vessel price in the state of Washington, and a 
seasonal dummy variable.
Prior to 1986, records of monthly prices of oysters 
transported from other states to the Virginia market were 
not available from VMRC, but VMRC did maintain data on 
monthly quantity supplied from other states. The use of a 
quantity variable in the demand function for the Virginia 
oysters to measure a change in demand for oysters is 
arguable. However, over half of the unshucked oysters are 
supplied from other regions, so it is impossible to ignore 
this factor in modelling the Virginia oyster market. March 
(1985) has suggested that a quantity variable may be used in 
the demand function; thus, the quantity supplied from other 
states used in the estimation results from the lack of the 
prices of oysters supplied by other states.
A consistent series of monthly wholesale prices for 
Virginia oysters is also unavailable after 1984; instead, an 
oyster wholesale price in Fulton, New York, is used as an 
instrumental variable. The shucked oysters are sold in the 
Fulton market as half-pint, selects (210-3 00/gallon), extra 
selects (160-210/gallon), and 100 count. The wholesale 
price index is a weighted price obtained by averaging the
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prices of selects and extra selects.
Pacific oysters differ both in taste and appearance 
from the eastern oysters. In the U.S., they are raised 
primarily on the west coast. Since Pacific oysters are also 
brought into the Virginia market, this study considers that 
the Pacific oyster may substitute for the eastern oyster. 
Oyster ex-vessel price in the state of Washington is used as 
the price of a substitute for the eastern oyster, because 
the state of Washington is the largest producer of the 
Pacific oyster in the nation.
Demand for oysters sharply increases during the 
Thanksgiving and Christmas seasons because oysters are a 
traditional food for these holidays (Haven et al., 1981; 
Dressel et al., 1983). A dummy variable is used to 
represent the seasonal shifts in the demand for oysters; its 
value will be given as one during these seasons, otherwise 
as zero.
The demand function for outside supplies is assumed to 
be affected by public and private production, the oyster 
ex-vessel price in the state of Washington, and a composite 
ex-vessel price index of other states. Before 19 60, the 
level of oyster shellstock from other states to Virginia was 
negligible, because Virginia oyster production was able to
supply processors' demand (Insley, 1986). The increase in 
demand for oyster supplies from other states was caused by a 
decrease in Virginia oyster production (Haven et al., 1981; 
Insley, 1986; VIMS, 1989). In addition, Haven et al. (1981) 
state that Virginia oyster processors pay higher prices for 
Maryland oysters than for Virginia oysters. Based on 
previous research, the demand for outside supply is unlikely 
to be determined by Virginia oyster prices. This study 
considers that production from public and private leased 
grounds will be independent variables in the demand function 
for outside supplies.
Since large quantities of oyster shellstock are brought 
from many states into Virginia oyster market, changes in the 
ex-vessel prices or deck prices of oysters from these states 
may affect the desires of Virginia oyster processors for 
purchasing shellstock from these states. There are 14 
states trading in the Virginia market during the observed 
periods: Alabama, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, 
Maine, Maryland (including the Potomac River), Missouri, 
Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, and Texas.
If all prices are included in the demand function, the 
degrees of freedom will be reduced, and there is likely to 
be severe multicollinearity among the price variables
(Schrank et al., 1988). Since these prices may vary in the 
same direction, a high correlation among the prices is 
likely to occur; alternatively, focusing on only one state 
introduces possible bias. Econometric concept suggests an 
aggregate price best reflects demand: the model thus 
considers a composite index of the ex-vessel prices of other 
states. The composite ex-vessel price is formed by an 
approximation to the Divisia aggregate:
. - Pi*Qi
Po = e iBl   (3.7)
where s represents the number of states that sell their 
oysters to Virginia. Although oyster supplies from Missouri 
are present in the records, they are unlikely to occur. The 
number of states used to construct the composite price index 
is 13. The state of Washington is not considered as one of 
the outside oyster supplier because of lack of records.
It is hypothesized that the oyster prices have negative 
effects on the quantity demand for public and private 
oysters (Table 9), while the wholesale price index and 
seasonal dummy variable may have positive effects on the 
demand for public and private oysters. Since the Pacific
Table 9. The hypothesized signs of the coefficients 
for the demand function.
Independent
Variable
Dependent Variable
Qdf Q d p Q d o
Pf ?» Negative _b
pP Negative ? -
Qjo Negative Negative -
Pwh Positive Positive
Pwa Positive Positive Positive
D, Positive Positive —
Qsr — — Negative
Q.P — — Negative
p0 Negative
Note:
* : the sign of coefficient is undetermined. 
b : the variable is not included.
oysters are assumed to be substitutes for the eastern 
oysters, the oyster ex-vessel price in the state of 
Washington may have a positive effect on the demand for 
public and private oysters. Oysters from other states are 
also assumed to be substitutes for oysters from public and 
private leased grounds. Therefore, oyster supply from other 
regions may have a negative effect on the demand for public 
ground fishery and private cultivated oysters, and 
production from public and private leased grounds may have a 
negative effect on the demand for outside oysters. Finally, 
the market relationship between public and private oysters 
is undetermined.
Supplies of Ovsters
Fishery supply is often assumed to be exogenous because 
it is affected predominantly by environmental and biological 
factors (Lin, 1984; Wang, 1984), implying that fish 
production will not be affected by its own-price. However, 
the assumption must assume simultaneously that the price 
level is acceptable, given the quantity supplied of a 
fishery product. Otherwise, commercial fishery may not 
exist without an acceptable price. The latter assumption 
implies that the price of the product is also exogenous. 
Therefore, both the own-price and supply of a fishery
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product are exogenous.
The goal of a commercial fisherman is to make a profit, 
a goal which relates to price and production. The market is 
thus determined simultaneously by production and price. The 
assumption of exogenous fish production resulting in an 
price unrelated to production violates a fundamental 
economic principle. This study proposes oyster supply 
functions for public and private oysters, even though data 
on environmental and biological variables are limited.
In contrast, the outside supply is assumed to be 
exogenous. This assumption implies that outside production 
is not influenced by the Virginia oyster market; therefore a 
supply function for outside supply is not proposed in this 
study. The supply functions for public and private oysters 
are specified as follows:
Public: Q(f = F(Pf, MSX, D2) (3.8)
Private: Qjp = F(Pp, Seed,.16/ MSX) (3.9)
where
is the dummy variable of the oyster fishing
season
MSX is the MSX and "Dermo" diseases index, and
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Seed,.,6 is the production of seed oysters two years 
prior to the present.
The supply function for public oysters, Equation 3.8, 
assumes that oyster production from public grounds is 
determined by its own price, a disease index, and a dummy 
variable for fishing season. Public production presents a 
seasonal pattern: production is high at the beginning of the 
fishing season and low at the end of the season. The eight 
months of oyster season are arbitrarily divided into two 
categories, the early and the late oyster seasons. The 
values of the seasonal dummy variable will be given as one 
for the first half of the oyster season and zero for the 
later half.
MSX and "Dermo" still threaten the Virginia oyster 
industry. To monitor disease activity, the oyster 
monitoring program at the Virginia Institute of Marine 
Science has used water temperature and salinity as disease 
indicators. In general, a temperature and salinity higher 
than the monthly average may indicate the threat of disease 
(Burreson, 1987).
Monthly water temperature and stream flow data are used 
to construct a disease indicator, MSX. Data are 
standardized initially by the monthly mean and deviation to
form an observed standard normal distribution with mean zero 
and variance unity. A negative value of flow represents a 
smaller flow than the monthly average of stream flow in 
terms of drought, while a positive value of water 
temperature represents a higher temperature than the monthly 
mean temperature. Finally, the standardized temperature 
data are subtracted from the stream flow data to form the 
disease index. A high water temperature and low flow will 
produce a high value of MSX, indicating a higher risk of the 
disease.
The supply function for private production assumes that 
oyster production from private leased grounds is determined 
by its price, seed oyster production of the previous two 
years, and the disease index. The production of seed 
oysters has been used as an index of expected production 
from leased bottoms two years later (Haven et al., 1981). A 
two-year lag of seed oyster production is represented by 16 
months, because there are four months of oyster season 
closure for each year.
It is hypothesized that oyster prices have positive 
effects on production in public ground fishery and private 
leased grounds (Table 10) and that the disease indicator may 
have a negative effect on both supply functions. Finally,
Table 10. The hypothesized signs of the coefficients 
for the supply function.
Independent
Variable
Dependent Variable
Qsf Qsp
Pf Positive —
MSX Negative Negative
d2 Positive —
Pp —  — * Positive
Seed,.16 - Positive
Note:
■ : the variable is not included.
seed production may have a positive effect on private 
production two years later.
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Identity Equations
The study assumes that each market sector is in 
equilibrium and that three identity equations for the market 
equilibrium are necessary:
Qf = Qdf = Qsf   (3.10)
Qp = Qdp = Qsp   (3.11)
Qo = Qdo = Qso   (3.12)
where
Qf is the production from public grounds,
Qp is the production from private leased grounds, and
Q0 is the quantity of oyster supply from other
states.
The identity equations state that the quantity demanded 
is equal to the quantity supplied for each market sector, 
based on the fact that the equilibrium of the Virginia 
oyster market will be achieved via quick adjustment and 
convergence. These identity equations complete the Virginia
oyster market system proposed in this study.
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Simulation
A simulation is an experiment conducted with a 
specially designed model of the system. Simulation has been 
widely used in many sciences to project the behavior of a 
system given past and current information; it has also been 
applied to an economic system when the analytical techniques 
cannot perform controlled experiments. The economic 
simulation can be used for various purposes such as model 
testing, forecasting, and policy analysis (Theil 1966; 
Naylor, 1971).
The purpose of simulation in this study is to assess 
the market behavior in response to the proposed objectives 
of the OFMP, which are to initiate an improved oyster 
fishery management and to achieve an optimum yield on a 
long-term basis. The primary objectives of the OFMP are to 
increase both public ground fishery production to at least 
700,000 bushels (20 percent above the ten-year average) by 
1993 and privately cultivated oysters to 700,000 bushels 
(the approximate twenty-year average) by 1995. The annual 
average of production is 380,000 bushels for public oysters 
and 285,000 bushels for private oysters, meaning that the
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proposed public production by the OFMP is 1.8 times larger 
than the observed annual public production, and the proposed 
private production is 2.5 times larger than the observed 
annual private production.
The market factors of the ex-vessel price, price paid 
to oyster planters, and outside supply are simulated given 
the estimated model and production proposed by the OFMP.
The proposed public and private production is assigned 
proportionally to each month, based on the monthly mean of 
production during the observed periods (1981-1989). Monthly 
mean of all exogenous variables will be used as input data. 
The October values are used as the initial points.
Data
Data used in estimating market demand and supply were 
obtained from a variety of sources. All information related 
to Virginia oyster production was from VMRC, and most 
non-Virginia oyster-related information originated from the 
Statistics Division of the National Marine Fisheries Service 
(NMFS). Other data were obtained from various sources, such 
as the Maryland Department of Natural Resources, the 
Department of Fisheries of the state of Washington, and 
Virginia Institute of Marine Science's published and
unpublished papers. Monthly data from 1981 to 1989 were 
used, except that for seed oysters, which were from 1979 to 
1987.
Data Limitation
In Virginia, oyster price paid to oystermen may vary 
based on the geographic location (Haven et al., 1981).
Prices are highest for oysters from the Rappahannock River, 
less for the York River, and lowest for the Eastern Shore 
oysters {JLARC, 1984). However, there is no evidence that 
the geographic variation of oyster prices is related to the 
quality of oysters (Haven et al., 1981). This study assumes 
that the variation, if any, caused by the product 
differentiation may be considered a minor effect. The use 
of aggregate production ignores the effect of product 
differentiation on the geographic variation.
It is believed that the ORP has a positive effect on 
the Virginia oyster industry (Haven, et al., 1981; Insley, 
1986); however, Abbe (1988) suggests that the program may 
have positive effects on sustaining good harvests only in 
good spat set years (Abbe, 1988). Unfortunately, the 
effects of the ORP on Virginia oyster production have never 
been confirmed by quantitative analysis because of data
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deficiency (JLARC, 1984; Thunberg and Santopietro, 1985; 
Shabman and Thunberg, 1988). Since the ORP data are formed 
annually, the ORP will not be considered in the economic 
model.
The state of Virginia prohibits harvesting oysters from 
public grounds between June and September in order to 
protect spawning stocks. Since there is no public ground 
fishery during these months, the data for public oyster 
production and ex-vessel prices are zeroes. The 
interruption of public ground fishery by Virginia laws and 
regulations creates two difficulties for the econometric 
estimation: the zero observations in the data cannot be 
considered as random samples, and the closure of the fishing 
season results in a discontinuous data series.
Tobin (1958) analyzed household expenditure on durable 
goods using a linear regression model. He found that there 
were no expenditures on certain durable goods when the 
incomes were lower than a certain level. This dependent 
variable with a limited range of data is called a limited 
dependent variable. A limited dependent variable is part 
qualitative (buy or not buy) and part quantitative (amount 
bought) in terms of discrete and continuous data (Pindyck 
and Rubinfeld, 1981), consequently an analysis of a limited 
dependent variable combines analyses of qualitative and
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quantitative measures.
Both limited dependent variable and production from 
public ground fishery consist of zeroes and non-zero data. 
The fundamental difference between the zeroes in the limited 
dependent variable and the production from public ground 
fishery is the definition of the dependent variable. The 
zeroes in the limited dependent variable are caused by the 
system itself because the decision to spend on the durable 
goods is determined within the system, by consumers. These 
zeroes are regarded as random samples.
Conversely, a ban on public ground fishery from June to 
September is imposed from outside the market system. These 
zeroes in public production cannot be interpreted as zero 
landings because they imply that oystermen can harvest 
oysters from public grounds. These zeroes actually state 
that oystermen cannot take oysters from public grounds at 
all: the zero public production results from the regulations 
rather than from the public ground fishery itself.
Therefore, the zero public production from public ground 
fishery may not co-exist with other non-zero data.
A dummy variable is commonly used as a qualitative 
factor, but adding a dummy variable as an independent 
variable to indicate the closure of the fishing season is
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unlikely to solve the problem. First, the dependent 
variable still cannot satisfy the assumption of random 
sampling if zeroes are included in the dependent variable. 
Also, the dummy variable is likely to create a difficulty in 
interpreting the closed season —  the result may have a 
certain amount of estimated public oyster production between 
June and September that should not be allowed.
As mentioned previously, the limited dependent variable 
and the dummy variable addition methods violate relevant 
assumptions. Since there are no adequate methods to solve 
the problem caused by oyster fishery regulations, a 
redefined universe of data domain is considered. As the 
zero values of public production resulting from the seasonal 
closure do not satisfy the econometric assumption, all data 
from June to September are omitted. This study considers 
the Virginia oyster market in which only public ground 
fishery exists. There is no oyster supply from public 
ground fishery, and therefore no market for public oysters 
can exist. The redefined data domain has no effect on the 
public market sector.
The oyster supplies from other states are low during 
the closed fishing season, ranging from 5 to 10 percent of 
its annual supply (Table 11). This study thus assumes that
Table 11. Percentage of total supplies of private and
outside Virginia in the closed fishing season 
(June-September).
Year Private Supplies Outside Supplies
Jun-Sep Total % Jun-Sep Total %
1981 131308 368286 0.36 98675 1423193 0.07
1982 94958 327139 0.29 65175 1207739 0 . 05
1983 92527 312406 0.30 46381 895210 0 . 05
1984 62448 249681 0.25 66917 778636 0 . 09
1985 112537 317930 0.35 78750 821079 0.10
1986 186511 406535 0.46 55584 713700 0 . 08
1987 110140 273245 0.40 24644 481393 0 . 05
1988 62369 158205 0.39 26291 456063 0.06
1989 61352 155571 0.39 24307 478725 0.05
Data Source: VMRC.
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the seasonal closure has little impact on the outside market 
sector and that the redefined data domain may have little 
effect on it as well.
On the other hand, production from private leased 
grounds during the seasonal closure is between 25 and 46 
percent of its annual production. The seasonal closure may 
have a definite impact on private oyster production: the 
redefined data domain will affect the private market sector, 
and the analysis of private market sector is not completed. 
Therefore, a supplemental model, incorporating all data, for 
the private market sector is provided.
Methodology for the Analysis
This study has proposed that the Virginia oyster 
shellstock market is comprised of the public ground fishery, 
private oyster cultivation, and outside supplies. Each 
market sector is assumed to be in equilibrium. Since the 
market equilibrium is determined by the intersection of the 
demand and supply curves, and each market sector is 
interrelated to other sectors, a simultaneous multiple- 
equations system is proposed.
In the linear regression model, the causal relationship 
between the dependent variable (Y) and the independent 
variables (Xs) is that Y is affected by X but not vice 
versa. However, the feedback from the dependent variable Y 
to the independent variables Xs is likely to occur in the 
market process; for instance, the quantity demanded or 
supplied is simultaneously interdependent on the price. A 
system describing the joint dependence of variables is 
called a system of simultaneous equations (Koutsyiannis, 
1973) .
The simultaneous multiple-equations system is common in 
market analysis because the market equilibrium is determined 
simultaneously both by demand and supply functions. Two 
methods commonly used to estimate a simultaneous 
multiple-equations system are Three-Stage Least Squares 
(3SLS) and Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML).
These methods are concerned not only with the correlation 
between the error term and some variables of the equation, 
but also with the correlation of error terms across the 
equations. The techniques and their differences can be 
found in Formby et al. (1988), Cramer (1986), Amemiya 
(1985), Intriligator (1978), and Koutsoyiannis (1973). The 
estimation method used in this study is FIML.
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Estimation
Several statistical tests may be invalid for testing 
the simultaneous multiple-equations system, such as the F 
statistic and determination of coefficient or R2 . Ra , a 
measure of the goodness of fit, is not bounded between zero 
and one, but is bounded between negative infinity and one in 
the simultaneous multiple-equations system. A small value 
of R2 consequently may not be an indication of a poor fit 
(Goldstein and Khan, 1978).
There are other criteria that measure the goodness of 
fit. The most popular alternatives are the Akaike 
information, Amemiya's prediction, and the Schwarz criteria 
(Kennedy, 1992). After comparing several criteria, Amemiya 
(1980) stated that "All of the criteria are based on 
somewhat arbitrary assumptions which cannot be fully 
justified...one can indefinitely go on inventing new 
criteria," and as a result, this study will not provide 
these criteria.
The statistic used to evaluate the fit of the model in 
the FIML technique is the value of the log of likelihood 
function, which measures the deviation of the observed data 
and the fitted data in a log form. A small number 
represents a small deviation between samples and fitted data
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and hence indicates a better fit.
Alternatively, the F and R2 also cannot be used to 
examine the performance of the simulation, and the 
Root-Mean-Square percentage error (RMS %) will be used as a 
criterion of the simulation analysis instead. The RMS % 
measures the sum of square of the percentage difference 
between the observations and the simulated data in squared 
root (Pindyck and Rubinfeld. 1981). A large value of the 
RMS % represents a great deviation between the observations 
and simulated data. The RMS % is defined as
i 1 yP_y°
RMS % - i V  (— £ £.)2   (3.18)N x?
where
Yp is the simulated or predicted endogenous variable,
Y° is the observed endogenous variable, and 
T is the number of data or periods in the simulation.
All estimation and tests will be performed using 
Soritec PC version 6.5. The convergence criterion of 0.001 
will be used. Each estimated parameter will be examined by 
a t-statistic at the five percent level of significance.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Estimation and Empirical Results
Estimation is complicated by the presence of 
multicollinearity and by serial correlation among some 
variables. Multicollinearity results in the problem that 
the estimates of the ordinary least squares (OLS) method may 
be inefficient, and statistical tests of the significance of 
the estimates tend not to reject the null hypothesis 
(Intriligator, 1978; Koutsoyiannis, 1973).
There are many options for dealing with 
multicollinearity: adding more non-correlated data, dropping 
one of the collinear variables, aggregating the collinear 
variables, or using the principal component and ridge 
techniques (Kennedy, 1992). The occurrence of 
multicollinearity depends upon the data set at hand (Kmenta, 
1971). Since multicollinearity is not caused by model 
misspecification, a change in the model structure or 
techniques may be inappropriate in many situations 
(Blanchard, 1987; Conlisk, 1971; Maddala, 1988). 
Alternatively, Blanchard (1987) suggests that the problem of
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multicollinearity may not be severe and may in fact be 
ignored if the t-statistics of the correlated variables are 
all greater than two.
The Virginia oyster ex-vessel price and the price paid 
to private planters were highly correlated; the correlation 
coefficient was 0.8, Since both prices were included in the 
demand functions for Virginia oysters, multicollinearity 
would pose a problem for estimation. However, a t-value for 
the difference between ex-vessel price and price paid to 
private oyster planters was 11.2, which indicated that both 
prices might have a different population distribution.
Also, the estimated coefficients for both prices were 
significantly different than zero, suggesting that the 
problems of multicollinearity in the model could be 
tolerated.
Serial correlation occurs when the error term for one 
observation is related to the error term for another 
(Kennedy, 1992). Since the error terms are not temporally 
independent, the estimates of the OLS are also inefficient: 
if positive serial correlation occurs, the problem for the 
estimated model is that variance of the estimated parameters 
may be underestimated.
The Durbin-Watson (DW) test has been widely used for
testing first order serial correlation. The value of the DW 
statistic, ranging from 0 to 4, falls into one of three 
classifications: serial correlation, no serial correlation, 
and inconclusive. If the DW is close to 2, there is no 
serial correlation within the observed data; if the DW is 
close to zero or 4, the samples are likely to have a strong 
positive or negative serial correlation. Also, there is an 
indeterminate or inclusive region between the no serial 
correlation and the strong serial correlation regions. For 
the simultaneous multiple-equations system with the problem 
of serial correlation, Goldfeld and Quandt (1972) suggest 
that the estimates from the nonlinear FIML method are more 
efficient than estimates from other methods.
The DW statistic indicated that first order serial 
correlation existed in all equations, except the demand 
function for private production. The original model was 
therefore transformed in order to incorporate the 
coefficient of serial correlation into the model (Table 12). 
A non-linear FIML method was then applied to the transformed 
model and estimated.
Convergence of the FIML procedure did not occur in the 
early analysis. This might be attributable to the nature of 
the samples —  in the collected data, the production
Table 12. The transformed econometric model.
Qfit = a (1-pi) +aj (Pflt-Pi*Pfln) +a2 (Pp>t-p1*Pp>w) +a3 (Q0.rPj*Q0l,-i) + 
a4 (Pwh,t“Pt*Pwh,t-l) +a5 (Pw*,t”Pl*Pwa,t-l) +a6 (Dlt”Pi*Dl,_i) “Pi *Qf,t-l
QP = b+b,*Pf+b2*Pp+b3*Q0+b4*Pwh+bs*Pw,+b6*Dl)
Qo,t =  C  ( 1 “P3) +C, ( Qf, ”P3*Qf,t.l ) + C 2 { Qp,rP3*Qp,t.l) + C 3 ( Poi,t”P3*Po.,t-l ) +
( P w a ,t“ ^ ~ ^  * w a ,l- l  )  “ P 3* Q o , t - l
Q f,t = d(l-p4)+d1(Pfirp4*Pf,t.1 )+d2(MSXr p4*MSXl.1)+d3(D2t-p4*D2l.1)
P 4 * Q f . t - l
Q Pl.  =  e ( l - p 5 ) + e | ( P P,t“ P 5 * P p , t . l ) + e 2 ( S E E D M 6 " P 5 * S E E D l - 1 7 )  +  
e3 (MSXl-pJ*MSX,.1) -P5*Qp>14
where
Qf is oyster production from public grounds,
Pf is the oyster ex-vessel price or dockside price,
Qp is oyster production from private leased grounds,
Pp is the price paid to private planters,
Qc is the supplies from other regions,
Pwh is the wholesale price index in Fulton market,
Pwa is the oyster ex-vessel price in the state of
Washington,
D1 is the seasonal demand dummy variable,
P0J is the composite price index for other states.
MSX is the MSX and "Dermo" diseases index,
D2 is the dummy variable of oyster fishing season,
SEED,.16 is production of seed oysters two years prior to
the present,
p is the serial correlation coefficients,
a - e are the parameters to be estimated, and
t-l is the variable lagged one period.
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variables consisted of large values, and the price and index 
variables of small values. The econometric package PC 
version by Soritec, Inc. may not deal well with this 
situation. Since the criterion had been set at 0.001, 
increasing the number of iteration was necessary to achieve 
convergence. Convergence finally occurred after 299 
iterations, and the value of the log of likelihood function 
was -2218. In contrast, the supplemental model for private 
market converged quickly after 15 iterations, and the value 
of the log of likelihood function was -1114.
Demand for Oysters
All estimated coefficients of the demand function for 
public oysters were significantly different from zero at the 
5 percent level of significance (Table 13). Thus, a change 
in any of the factors would have a significant influence on 
the demand for public oysters. The DW statistic was 1.55, 
indicating that serial correlation was uncertain.
A negative coefficient for ex-vessel price suggested 
that price had a negative effect on the quantity demanded.
A dollar increase in ex-vessel price would decrease the 
quantity demanded for public oysters by 2 3 thousand bushels.
Table 13. Parameter estimates for the demand function for
public oysters.
Variable Coefficient Standard Dev. Elasticity
Constant 4847.14 58.05
Pf -23154.30 ** 5129.21 -6.48
Pp -8711.41 ** 1917.10 -4 .21
Qjo 3.12 ** 0.44
Pwh 7163.34 ** 2016.41
pw» -795.58 ** 162.99 -0.02
D1 4554.41 *b 1800.29
Pi 0.41 ** 0. 03
DWC 1.55
Note:
* - Significantly different from zero at the one percent 
level.
b - Significantly different from zero at the five percent 
level.
e - Durbin-Watson statistic.
«
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The own-price elasticity, evaluated at mean values, -6.48, 
indicated also that demand for public oysters was highly 
elastic. A change in ex-vessel price would have a large 
effect on the demand for public production.
The price paid to private planters was found to have a 
negative effect on the demand for public oysters. A dollar 
increase in the price paid to private planters would 
decrease demand for public oysters by about eight thousand 
bushels. The negative coefficient implied that oysters from 
private leased grounds were complementary to oysters from 
public grounds. Demand for oysters from public grounds was 
highly responsive to changes in the price paid to private 
planters, indicated by a cross-price elasticity of -4.21.
The coefficient for outside supply was positive, which 
contradicted the prior hypothesis that outside supplies were 
substitutes for oysters from public grounds and had a 
negative effect on the demand for public oysters. The 
interpretation that an increase in one bushel of oysters 
supplied from outside would increase the demand for public 
production by three bushels was paradoxical.
A positive sign for the wholesale price index suggested 
that the wholesale price in the Fulton market had a positive 
effect on Virginia oyster processors7 demand for public
production. An increase in the wholesale price would 
encourage oyster processors to buy more public oysters. The 
seasonal dummy variable also had a positive coefficient: 
during the Thanksgiving and Christmas seasons, the demand 
for public oysters increased 4.6 thousand bushels more than 
during the rest of the seasons.
The coefficient for the oyster ex-vessel price in the 
state of Washington was negative, contradicting prior 
substitution expectation. A negative coefficient suggested 
that oysters from the state of Washington were complementary 
to oysters from public grounds. A dollar increase in the 
oyster ex-vessel price of Washington may decrease the demand 
for public oysters by 800 bushels. The cross-price 
elasticity, however, was relatively small (0.02). However, 
a one-hundred percent increase in the oyster ex-vessel price 
of Washington would reduce demand for public oysters by only 
two percent.
All estimated coefficients of the demand function for 
private oysters were significantly different than zero 
(Table 14-a), and all signs of coefficients in the demand 
function for private oysters were the same as the demand 
function for public, except the oyster ex-vessel price in 
the state of Washington. A positive coefficient for outside
Table 14-a. Parameters estimate for the demand function
for private oysters.
Variable Coefficient Standard Dev. Elasticity
Constant 1 2 8 3 3 , 8 0  * * a 9 3 0 . 0 3
Pf - 1 7 8 5 . 5 5  * b 7 7 1 . 2 2 - 0 . 5
Pp - 1 5 7 0 . 7 4  * * 4 3 4 . 9 8 - 0 . 7 6
Qso 0 . 1 0  ** 0 .  03
Pwh 1 0 9 0 . 7 9  * * 2 4 8 . 4 0
pwa 4 5 4 5 . 0 0  * * 9 3 6 . 5 7 0 . 1 9
D1 1 7 9 1 . 5 9  * * 6 6 9 . 7 9
DW* 1 . 5 5
Note:
* - Significantly different from zero at the one percent 
level.
b - Significantly different from zero at the five percent 
level.
c - Durbin-Watson statistic.
Table 14-b. Parameters estimate for the demand function
for private oysters".
Variable Coefficient Standard Dev. Elasticity
Constant 10191.10 **b 1.635
Pf -1401.33 ** 13.739
Pp -1650.52 ** 14.011 -0. 74
Qso 0.06 0.021
Pwh 1158.58 ** 46.985
P\VB 94.82 ** 1. 696
D1 985.24 ** 1.004
DW* 0.84
Note:
" - The estimation includes June - September data.
b - Significantly different from zero at the one percent 
level.
c - Durbin-Watson statistic.
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supply which contradicted the expectation was also found for 
the demand function for private oysters. The DW statistic 
of 1.55 indicated that serial correlation was indeterminate.
The coefficient for the ex-vessel price was negative, 
suggesting that oysters from public grounds were also 
complementary to oysters from private leased grounds. Since 
oysters from both public and private leased grounds are 
complements, an increase in the price of one would decrease 
the demand for the other. However, a small cross-price 
elasticity indicated that the demand for private was not 
very sensitive to the ex-vessel price. A one percent 
increase in ex-vessel price would decrease the demand for 
private oysters by 0.5 percent.
The coefficient for the price paid to private oyster 
planters was negative, which confirmed the assumption that 
price had a negative impact on quantity demanded. A dollar 
increase in price paid to private planters would decrease 
the demand for private oysters by 1.5 thousand bushels; 
however, the own-price elasticity suggested that the demand 
for private oysters was not sensitive to its own-price. If 
the price paid to private planters was increased by one 
percent, the demand for private oysters would decrease by 
0.76 percent.
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Estimated coefficients for the wholesale price index 
and the dummy variable were positive: an increase in oyster 
wholesale price in Fulton market would increase the Virginia 
processors' demand for private oysters. Demand for private 
oysters would also increase during the Thanksgiving and 
Christmas seasons. However, the amount of increase in the 
demand for private oysters was not as large as that for 
public oysters.
The coefficient for the oyster ex-vessel price in the 
state of Washington oysters was positive, suggesting that 
the Pacific oyster was a substitute for the Virginia oyster 
from private leased grounds. The small cross-price 
elasticity, 0.19, suggested that demand for private oysters 
was not very sensitive to the oyster ex-vessel price of the 
Washington oysters —  a ten-percent increase in the oyster 
ex-vessel price in Washington would increase the demand for 
private oysters by only two percent.
All signs of coefficients in the supplemental demand 
function for private oysters, including information between 
June and September, were the same as in the original model 
(Table 14-b). The demand for private oysters was also 
inelastic at 0.74. However, the coefficient for outside 
supplies was no longer statistically significant, since the 
DW statistic was 0.84, indicating the occurrence of serial
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correlation of the model.
All estimated coefficients of the demand function for 
outside supplies were significantly different than zero 
(Table 15), meaning that a change in any of the factors 
would have a significant influence on the demand for outside 
supply. These estimated parameters might be biased since 
the demand function was missing a relevant variable, the 
price for outside supply. The DW statistic was 1.58, which 
indicated that serial correlation was uncertain.
The coefficient for private production was negative, 
which indicated that oysters from private leased grounds 
were substitutes for outside supplies. An increase in 
private production would decrease the demand for outside 
supply. Alternatively, the coefficient for public 
production was positive. The negative coefficient 
contradicted the prior hypothesis that public production had 
a negative effect on the demand for outside supplies.
A positive coefficient for the composite ex-vessel 
price index was also contrary to prior expectations, 
suggesting that an increase in the ex-vessel price in other 
states would increase processors' demand for outside 
supplies. A negative coefficient of the oyster ex-vessel
Table 15. Parameter estimates for the demand function for 
outside supplies.
Variable Coefficient Standard Dev. Elasticity
Constant 16455.5 1014.20
Qf 0.4 ** 0.07
QP -0.5 ** 0.14
p0 12260.7 ** 2539.04
P wa -10927.7 ** 2095.20 -0.11
Pi t -0.37** 0.04
DW 1. 58
Note:
" - Significantly different from zero at the one percent 
level.
b - Durbin-Watson statistic.
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price in the state of Washington was found in the demand 
function for outside supply, making Pacific oysters 
complementary to oysters from other regions. The demand for 
outside supplies was still not very sensitive to the oyster 
ex-vessel price in the state of Washington because of the 
small cross-price elasticity: a ten percent increase in the 
oyster ex-vessel price in the state of Washington would only 
increase the demand for outside supply by 1.1 percent.
Supplies of Oysters
The study assumed that the ex-vessel price, disease 
index, and seasonal changes were the most important factors 
for the public supply function, but the statistical results 
indicated that only the seasonal variable was important to 
oyster production from public grounds (Table 16). The DW 
statistic was 1.9 for the public supply function, which 
indicated no serial correlation in the transformed supply 
function.
A positive coefficient for the ex-vessel price 
confirmed the hypothesis that price had a positive effect on 
the quantity supplied. However, the coefficient of 
ex-vessel price was not significantly different than zero at
Table 16. Parameter estimates for the supply function for
public oysters.
Variable Coefficient Standard Dev. Elasticity
constant 6143.99 **a 409.48
Pf 87 . 06 225.24 0.02
MSX 2234.28 1320.27
D2 21065.00 ** 731.01
Pi bDW
-0.43 ** 
1.90
0.60
Note:
* - Significantly different from zero at the one percent 
level.
b - Durbin-Watson statistic.
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the 5 percent level of significance, and the own-price 
elastic of supply was relatively small as well (0.02).
These suggested that the ex-vessel price within the observed 
ranges was not an important determinant for public 
production.
The coefficient for the disease index was positive but 
not significantly different from zero, meaning the factor of 
diseases was not important to public production during the 
observed periods. This contradicted the previous assumption 
that disease was one of the most important factors causing a 
decrease in Virginia oyster production. Conversely, the 
coefficient for the seasonal variable was positive and 
statistically significant. Oysters production from public 
grounds was determined primarily by the season: supply from 
public grounds was 21,000 bushels higher in the early 
fishing season than in the late.
The supply function for private oysters was assumed to 
be determined by the price paid to private planters, seed 
oyster production, and the disease index. Production of 
seed oysters was assumed to have positive effect on private 
production two years later. The DW statistic was 1.91, 
showing no serial correlation in the transformed supply 
function (Table 17-a).
Table 17-a. Parameter estimates for the supply function
for private oysters.
Variable Coefficient Standard Dev. Elasticity
Constant 9285.23 **■ 141.99
Pp 25523.90 ** 5509.53 12 .35
SeeH6 -0.01 0.09
MSX 3202.82 ** 688.50
bDW
0.87 ** 
1.91
0.04
Note:
* - Significantly different from zero at the one percent 
level.
b - Durbin-Watson statistic.
Table 17-b. Parameter estimates for the supply function
for private oysters*.
Variable Coefficient Standard Dev. Elasticity
Constant 8639.06 **b 1.00001
Pp 21258.20 ** 1.02972 9.53
See«.i6 -0. 24 0.15488
MSX -2525.19 ** 1.00180
Pa 0.83 ** 0.02
DW® 1.7
Note:
* - The estimation includes June - September data.
b - Significantly different from zero at the one percent 
level.
c - Durbin-Watson statistic.
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The price paid to private planters had a positive 
coefficient. Oyster production from private leased grounds 
was sensitive to its price because of the high own-price 
elasticity of supply. A one percent increase in the price 
paid to private planters would increase oyster production 
from private leased grounds by 12.35 percent.
The negative coefficient for seed oyster production 
confounded prior expectations, but the coefficient was not 
significantly different from zero —  production of seed 
oysters was not important to private production. The 
negative coefficient for seed oyster production may be 
caused by large mortality because of disease in the private 
sector during the observed periods. The disease index had a 
positive coefficient, also contrary to the hypothesis that 
disease negatively affects private production.
All signs of coefficients in the supplemental supply 
function for private oysters, including information between 
June and September, were the same as in the original supply 
model, except for the coefficient for MSX index (Table 17- 
b). A significantly negative sign of coefficient for 
disease index suggested that disease had negative impact on 
private production. The supply of private oysters was also 
elastic.
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Discussion
Empirical results suggested several conclusions 
contrary to prior expectations. First, the estimated supply 
functions for public and private oysters had positive signs 
for the disease index. A higher value of the index 
indicated a higher risk of the disease. However, the 
occurrence of diseases was triggered by many thresholds: 
water temperature, salinity, and time of incubation. For 
instance, the mortality of "Dermo" was largely found in 
oysters from two to four years old, and disease was 
eliminated during the winter season. Also, the water 
temperature and salinity were related to the growth of 
oysters: a high temperature or high salinity would have a 
positive effect on oyster growth.
The coefficient for the disease index was negative and 
significantly different from zero in the supplemental model. 
The significantly negative coefficient suggested that 
disease was an important factor for private production. The 
different results of the supplemental and original private 
supply functions were caused by the included or excluded 
information in the closed fishing season. High disease 
mortality occurred during the closed fishing season because 
of high water temperature; excluding information between
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June and September thus underestimated the prevalence of 
diseases. Therefore, the positive coefficient for the 
disease index in public and private supply functions might 
indicate growth of oysters and not disease occurrence.
A positive coefficient for the composite ex-vessel 
price index variable in the estimated demand function for 
outside supply indicated that an increase in the price of 
oysters from other states would increase Virginia 
processors' demand for outside supplies. The positive 
coefficient occurred if an increase in the oyster ex-vessel 
price in other states was caused by the increase in the 
total demand for eastern oysters. It was also possible that 
estimates of demand function for outside supply were biased 
as a result of the excluded price paid to outside supply. 
Lacking adequate information, the cause of the positive 
coefficient for the composite ex-vessel price could not be 
concluded.
Market Equilibrium for Public Ovsters
The estimated demand and supply functions for public 
oysters indicated that the market equilibrium for public 
ground fishery consisted of an elastic demand and a very 
inelastic supply. If public production increased, the
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supply curve shifted to the right; if the demand for public 
oysters was held constant, the equilibrium would shift down 
and to the right. The shift in supply curve resulted in a 
decrease in the ex-vessel price and an increase in the 
quantity demanded for public oysters. since the demand for 
public oysters was elastic, an increase in public production 
would be likely to increase the total revenue for public 
ground fishery.
The supply curve shifted instead to the left if oyster 
production from public grounds was decreased further. The 
equilibrium would shift up and to the left if the demand for 
public oysters was held constant. The shift in the supply 
curve caused an increase in the ex-vessel price and a 
decrease in the quantity demanded. Therefore, a continuous 
decline in public production would decrease the total 
revenue for public ground fishery.
The estimated demand and supply functions for public 
also indicated that the market for public oysters was 
seasonal, with a relatively high demand for public oysters 
occurring during the Thanksgiving and Christmas seasons 
along with a relatively high supply from public grounds, 
causing both demand and supply curves to shift seasonally. 
Since the market for public oysters consisted of an elastic 
demand and a very inelastic supply, the seasonal shifts in
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the public oyster market would yield higher total revenue in 
the early season than in the late.
Market Equilibrium for Private Oysters
There was little difference in two private market 
sectors: included and excluded June-September data. Both 
models indicated that the market equilibrium for private 
oysters was determined by an inelastic demand and a highly 
elastic supply. If private production increased, the supply 
curve would shift to the right, causing a decrease in the 
price paid to private planters if the demand for private 
oysters was held constant. Since the demand for private 
oysters was inelastic, an increase in private production 
would decrease the total revenue for private planters. 
Alternatively, a decrease in private production was likely 
to increase the total revenue for the private oyster 
industry.
Alternatively, if the demand for private oysters 
increased, the demand curve shifted to the right. The shift 
in demand oysters would increase not only the price but also 
production if the supply curve was held constant, indicating 
that increase in the demand for private production would 
increase the total revenue for private oyster planters.
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The structure of market equilibrium for private 
oysters, consisting of inelastic demand and elastic supply, 
was opposite to the public market. In the public market 
sector, production from public ground fishery increased as 
demand for oysters was high, and production decreased as 
demand was low (Fig. 9). In contrast, production from 
private leased grounds decreased as the price rose and 
production increased as price dropped (Fig. 10).
The difference of market structure between public and 
private oysters was based on a lower price for private 
oysters than the ex-vessel price during the observed 
periods. This phenomenon suggested that private oyster 
growers had less costs than oystermen, but this was 
questionable. Some private oyster planters also owned 
oyster processing houses, which possibly resulted in a low 
price paid to private oyster planters. Therefore, the 
quantity demanded and supplied of oysters from private 
leased grounds might represent processors' needs and not be 
the real market demand.
Market Relationships among Oysters
A shift in market equilibrium was caused not only by
Figure 9
Monthly production and price of public ground fishery.
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Figure 10
Monthly production and price for private oysters.
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changes in price and production of a commodity but also by 
changes in price and production of related commodities. 
Consequently, each market sector was affected by the other 
sectors: the market relationships among various oysters from 
different sources were determined by the cross-price 
elasticity.
Oysters from public ground fishery and private leased 
grounds were complements: an increase in the price of one 
would decrease the quantity demanded for both oysters. 
Oysters from public ground fishery and outside supplies were 
also complements. However, oysters from private leased 
grounds and outside supplies were substitutes. An increase 
in the price paid to private oyster planters would increase 
the demand for outside supplies.
In general, the market relationship between Pacific and 
eastern oysters was weak because of the small values of 
cross-price elasticities. Pacific oysters were substitutes 
for oysters from private leased grounds, complements for 
outside supply, and independent goods for oysters from 
public grounds —  oysters from private leased grounds and 
the Pacific oysters would compete with each other in the 
Virginia oyster market. An increase in the oyster ex-vessel 
price of Washington would likely increase the demand for 
private oysters.
101
On the other hand, an increase in the oyster ex-vessel 
price in the state of Washington would decrease the demand 
for outside supplies. The demand for public oysters was 
unlikely to be affected by the changes in the oyster 
ex-vessel prices of Washington.
The results of the model indicated that most market 
relationships among oysters were complementary (Table 18). 
Since the demand for oysters was related to the seasons, the 
study suggested that the complementary relationships among 
oysters were caused by the seasonal demand.
The Ex-vessel Price
Production from public grounds was not affected by the 
ex-vessel price, as indicated by the statistically 
insignificant coefficient. From an economic point of view, 
an irrelevant price indicates that the supply curve is 
vertical to the X axis and has a zero elasticity of supply, 
or a perfectly inelastic supply. The perfect inelasticity 
of supply usually occurs in a very short market period 
(Bronfenbrenner et al., 1986). In the very short market 
period, the supply of a commodity in the market is fixed 
because the time period is too short to produce or transport
Table 18. The relationships among oysters from different 
sources.
Market Demand 
for
Oysters from
Public Private Outside Washington
Public Oysters — C C
Private Oysters Cc ----- C s d
Outside supply c s ------ c
Note:
4 - no estimation. 
b - Independent. 
c - Complements. 
d - Substitutes.
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any amount of the commodity into the market; thus the supply 
of a commodity cannot be affected by changes in its own 
price.
However, the market period used in the study was 
assumed to be sufficient for the market adjustment.
Harvested oysters would reach the market in a short period, 
so the unrelated ex-vessel price to public production was 
not caused by the market period. The insignificant 
coefficient for the ex-vessel price implied that stock 
levels were limited (Smith and Peterson, 1979; Kirkley,
1986). As the ex-vessel price increased, it was impossible 
to increase oyster production given the current oyster stock 
and fishing effort. Since Virginia laws and regulations 
were inadequate to manage oyster stocks, the study suggested 
that the ex-vessel price unrelated to public production 
occurred because of limited stocks on public grounds.
PRICE, REVENUE, AND OYSTER MANAGEMENT
Simulation
As suggested previously, as the demand or supply of 
Virginia oysters was changed the market equilibrium of 
Virginia oysters would shift. Since the demand for Virginia 
oysters was related to that for other oysters, changes in 
the demand or supply of other oysters would also affect the 
Virginia oyster market. The purpose of the simulation was 
to analyze such impacts.
The simulation was based on the market equilibrium 
given an estimated economic system, but the process also 
involved shifts in the market equilibrium; for instance, the 
ex-vessel price was simulated through the entire oyster 
season. The simulation process thus included changes not 
only in oyster production and prices but also in the 
seasonal demand.
The observed mean of the ex-vessel price and price paid 
to private planters was considered as only one base. The 
simulation of the experiments was classed into two groups:
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the first based on the observed production level, the other 
on the OFMP proposed level (Table 19).
In Group One, there were five experiments: (1) the 
success of the OFMP, (2) the failure of the OFMP, (3) a 
continuous decline in current production, (4) a decrease in 
the ex-vessel price of Washington oysters, and (5) an 
increase in the demand for outside supplies. A 50 percent 
increase in the observed mean of public and private 
production was assumed given that the OFMP improved Virginia 
oyster production but did not achieve its goal. 
Alternatively, a decline in oyster production would continue 
if VMRC could not reverse the current downward trend. A 50 
percent decrease in the observed public and private 
production was proposed.
Oyster production in the state of Washington increased 
over the periods. A decrease in the ex-vessel price of 
Washington oysters would occur if the demand for Pacific 
oysters was held constant; therefore, a 20 percent decrease 
in the oyster ex-vessel price of Washington was assumed. On 
the other hand, the demand for outside supplies would 
increase if the ex-vessel price in other states was 
decreased due to the increase in production; a 20 percent 
increase in the demand for outside supplies was assumed.
Table 19. The experiments of simulation
Group Experiment
1. An increase in the observed production to the 
OFMP proposed level
2. An increase in the observed production by 50 
percent
One 3. An decrease in the observed production by 50
percent
4. A decrease in the ex-vessel price of Washington 
oysters by 20 percent
5. An increase in the demand for outside supply by 
20 percent
1. An increase in the observed production to the 
OFMP proposed level
Two 2. A decrease in the oyster ex-vessel price of
Washington by 20 percent
3. An increase in outside supply by 20 percent
Others 1. An increase in the observed private production 
by 50 percent
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In addition to the success of the OFMP, there were two 
experiments in Group Two: a decrease in the ex-vessel price 
of Washington oysters and an increase in the demand for 
outside supplies while Virginia production increased 
simultaneously to the OFMP proposed level. Group Two's 
simulation was based on the success of the OFMP, and its 
experiments would analyze the impacts of the OFMP on the 
demand or supply of oysters from other areas.
In addition, there was an experiment increasing only 
private production. Because the market relationship between 
private oysters and outside supplies was not clear in the 
previous analysis, the experiment was necessary to determine 
the effect of private oysters on outside supplies.
All given values of percentage in the experiments were 
arbitrary. All experiments in Group One were compared to 
the base; in Group Two, all experiments were compared to the 
simulated OFMP.
Simulation on Group One
Price and Revenue for Public Oysters
The results of simulation on the ex-vessel price were
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mixed compared to the base one (Fig. 11-a). If Virginia 
oyster production was increased as the first and second 
scenarios assumed, the ex-vessel price would increase and 
then decrease. If oyster production decreased as assumed 
experiment 3, the ex-vessel price decreased in the late 
season.
The ex-vessel price fell sharply during the late 
season, particularly in the experiment on the success of the 
OFMP. The reduction of ex-vessel price was caused primarily 
by a large increase in total production: proposed public 
production was 1.85 times larger than observed public 
production, and proposed private production was 2.45 times 
larger than observed private production. As previously 
indicated, the demand for public oysters was low during the 
later season, so it was possible that a large scale of 
increase in oyster production might result in a very low 
ex-vessel.
Conversely, an increase in the ex-vessel price in 
November and December should not be interpreted as a 
positive slope of the demand curve for public oysters during 
these months. The model simulation was based on the market 
equilibrium. An increase in the supply implied that the 
demand for oysters also increased; the market equilibrium
Figure 11
Price and revenue simulations for public oysters.
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for the scenarios one and two would have a higher demand for 
public oysters than the base. For such high demand in the 
early season, the proposed production could not satisfy the 
demand; for instance, a 50 percent increase in Virginia 
oyster production could not reduce the ex-vessel price of 
November and December, which was reduced as production 
increased to the OFMP proposed level.
In general, an increase in the demand for outside 
supply decreased the ex-vessel price, indicating that 
oysters from other regions were complementary to public 
oysters, but a decrease in the ex-vessel price of Washington 
oysters did not have a consistent effect on the ex-vessel 
price. This suggested that Pacific oysters and oysters from 
public ground fishery were independent goods.
As Virginia oyster production increased, the total 
revenue for public ground fishery also increased, except 
during April and May (Fig. 11-b). A large increase in the 
total revenue in the early season resulted from an increase 
in the demand and supply of public oysters, and a negative 
revenue in the late season resulted from a large decrease in 
the ex-vessel price. The results of simulation indicated 
that the total revenue would decrease if Virginia oyster 
production continuously declined.
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As the ex-vessel price of Washington oysters was 
decreased by 20 percent, or the demand for outside supply 
increased by 20 percent, changes in the total revenue for 
public ground fishery were negligible. These indicated that 
the market relationships among public oysters, oysters from 
other regions, and Pacific oysters were weak. Thus, changes 
in the demand or supply for outside supplies and Pacific 
oysters would have little effect on the total revenue for 
public ground fishery.
Price and Revenue for Private Oysters
In most experiments, the prices paid to private 
planters were higher than the base (Fig. 12-a). A lower 
observed price was expected because many oyster processors 
were also oyster growers. As total production increased, 
the price paid to private planters increased, higher in the 
late season than the early season. This study suggested 
that the price paid to private planters might not be the 
market price. Also, the increase in oyster production might 
result from the increased demand. Therefore, an increase in 
production would elevate the price.
The total revenue for the private oyster industry
Figure 12
Price and revenue simulations for private oysters.
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increased as Virginia oyster production increased (Fig.
12-b). The increase in the total revenue resulted from the 
increases in price and production, but the total revenue 
would decrease if production fell. Changes in demand or 
supply of Washington oysters and outside supplies would 
slightly affect the total revenue for private oyster 
industry in later season.
Oyster Supplies from Other Regions
The results of simulation indicated that demand for 
outside supplies would increase if Virginia oyster 
production increased (Fig, 13). The increase in outside 
supply resulted from the increase in public production, 
because oysters from public grounds were complementary to 
oysters from other regions.
A decrease in the ex-vessel price of Washington oysters 
did not have consistent impact on the outside supplies, 
suggesting that Pacific oysters were independent of outside 
supplies. Finally, an increase in private production only 
decreased the demand for outside supplies in the early 
season. Oysters from private leased grounds would thus be 
substitutes for outside supplies when the demand for outside 
supplies was high.
Figure 13
Simulation on oyster from other regions.
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Simulation on Group Two
The results of the model indicated that changes in the 
demand for outside supplies or supply of Washington oysters 
or public oysters had little effect on both public ground 
fishery and private production (Fig. 14 and 15). This 
suggested that the market relationships between Virginia 
oysters and outside supply and Pacific oyster were weak. As 
Virginia oyster production increased to the OFMP proposed 
levels, a 2 0 percent decrease in the ex-vessel price of 
Washington oysters or 20 percent increase in the outside 
supplies would have little impact on the total revenue of 
Virginia oyster industry.
Virginia oyster Market and Management
Virginia Public Ground Fishery
As demonstrated previously, the ex-vessel price was 
unrelated to public production and the low oyster CPUE 
suggests that current oyster stocks in "the public grounds 
are limited. The results of the model suggest that 
regulations to limit fishing effort are necessary to 
maintain and increase stock levels. Also, the results of 
simulation indicate that most total revenue for public
Figure 14
Price and revenue simulations for public oysters.
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Price and revenue simulations for private oysters.
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ground fishery will increase if Virginia oyster production 
increases. Any improvement of production from public 
grounds will benefit the public oyster industry.
However, model simulation indicates that the effects of 
production proposed by the OFMP on the Virginia oyster 
market are affected by the seasonal demand. Also, the rate 
of net percentage increase in the total revenue is 
relatively small in the late season (Table 20). These may 
provide two implications for oyster management strategies; 
first, oyster season may be shortened, ending in April 
instead of the current June. The extension of seasonal 
closure would have little effect on public ground fishery 
because demand is low and the total revenue negative during 
these two months. This conclusion is valid only when the 
stock levels recover.
Second, the objective of an increase in public oysters 
to 700,000 bushels or an 85 percent increase in the observed 
mean may be set too high. The simulation results indicate 
that total revenue for public ground fishery falls quickly. 
This study suggests that to maintain a high level of public 
production set by the OFMP may not be necessary if a large 
investment is required to achieve it.
Table 20. The net percentage increase in the total
revenue for public oysters.
Group One Experiment
Month OFMP 2 3 4 5
Oct. 0. 846 0.5 -0.5 0 0
Nov. 1.143 0.786 -0.478 0.142 0.105
Dec. 0. 789 0.607 -0.511 0.058 0. 002
Jan. 0.220 0.313 -0.536 -0.054 -0.119
Feb. 0.404 0.486 -0.473 0.073 0.015
Mar. 0.156 0.322 -0.481 0.012 -0.049
Apr. -0.343 0.088 -0.467 -0.042 -0.132
May -0.555 -0.015 -0.472 -0.079 -0.152
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Private Ovster Cultivation
The results of simulation indicate that the total 
revenue for private planters will increase as Virginia 
oyster production increases. The rate of net revenue is 
relatively high (Table 21), suggesting that a high level of 
private production will yield large revenue to private 
oyster industry. Thus, regulations to provide incentives to 
private oyster cultivation are necessary.
The results of the model indicate that production of 
seed oysters is unimportant for providing private production 
within observed periods. The seed production unrelated to 
private production may result from the high disease 
mortality —  the ORP's goal of providing sufficient seed 
oysters to private planters may be irrelevant. This study 
suggests that the ORP may provide low costs of seed oysters 
to private planters.
Historically, private production was dominant in 
Virginia oyster production. Oyster production from private 
leased grounds was more efficient in producing oysters than 
public grounds (Haven et al., 1981). Also, the results of 
simulation indicate that an increase in Virginia oyster 
production will largely benefit the private oyster industry.
Table 21. The net percentage increase in the total
revenue for private oysters.
Group One Experiment
Month OFMP 2 3 4 5
Oct. 1.452 0.5 -0.5 0 0
Nov. 1.635 0.549 -0.503 0.010 0. 017
Dec. 1.650 0.492 -0.544 -0.053 -0.037
Jan. 2.494 0.871 -0.464 0.148 0. 173
Feb. 2.892 1. 007 -0.456 0.197 0.224
Mar. 3.400 1.226 -0.416 0.306 0.339
Apr. 3.283 1.129 -0.459 0.228 0.268
May 3.089 0.987 -0.516 0.123 0.159
122
Hargis and Haven (1988b) suggest that to revive the Virginia 
oyster industry, the OFMP should rely on increasing private 
production.
Introduction of the Pacific Oysters
The introduction of the Pacific oysters into the West 
Coast has revived the oyster industry there. Thus, the 
suggestion of introducing Pacific oysters into Virginia has 
emerged. The Pacific oyster, unlike the eastern oyster, is 
less susceptible to diseases (Leffler, 1988), and it is 
believed that the Pacific oyster may have a higher survival 
rate than the eastern oyster in unfavorable conditions 
(VIMS, 1991). However, there is also a fear that the exotic 
Pacific oyster may expel the native oyster (Leffler, 1988). 
Since this study is not concerned with the biological 
characteristics of oysters, all suggestions will be based on 
the market interactions among oysters from various areas.
The results of the model suggest that oysters from 
public grounds are independent or weakly complementary to 
the Pacific oysters, meaning that the oysters will not 
compete with each other in the Virginia market, and 
introducing Pacific oysters to Virginia waters may have 
little effect on public production. Alternatively, the
Pacific oysters are substitutes for oysters from private 
leased grounds. Since both oysters are substitutable in the 
Virginia oyster market, raising Pacific oysters in private 
leased grounds may be an alternative to private planters.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
An overview
Virginia oyster production has declined because of many 
factors, and to revive the industry, VMRC has developed the 
OFMP to improve oyster production. The purposes of the 
study were to examine the market interrelationships among 
oysters from different sources and to evaluate the effect of 
the OFMP on the Virginia oyster market.
The Analytical Framework
This study developed the conceptual framework of the 
Virginia oyster market. The framework assumed that the 
Virginia oyster market was in equilibrium; although various 
laws and regulations have been posed on public ground 
fishery, the assumption of market equilibrium was 
maintained.
Since Virginia processors obtained various oysters from 
different sources, this study proposed that the Virginia
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oyster market was made up of three sectors: public ground 
fishery, private oyster cultivation, and oyster supply from 
other regions. A complete market system consisted of eight 
market functions. These market relationships were estimated 
through the use of econometric analysis by the FIML 
technique.
The OFMP would greatly increase oyster production from 
public ground fishery and private leased grounds, and its 
success therefore would have a large effect on the current 
Virginia oyster market. A simulation model was used to 
project the impact of the OFMP on market behavior.
Virginia Oyster Market
The empirical results of the econometric analysis 
suggested that the market equilibrium for the public sector 
consisted of an elastic demand curve and a very inelastic 
supply curve, but the private market sector consisted of an 
inelastic demand curve and an elastic supply curve. The 
difference between the public and private oyster market 
resulted from a lower price in the private market sector.
The market relationships among oysters from different
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sources were identified. Oysters from public grounds were 
complementary to oysters from private leased grounds and 
outside supplies. An increase in the ex-vessel price would 
thus decrease the demand for private oysters and outside 
supplies.
Alternatively, oysters from private leased grounds 
substituted for oysters from other regions, suggesting that 
oysters from private leased grounds would compete with 
outside supplies. An increase in the price paid to the 
former would increase the demand for the latter.
Pacific oysters were independent of public oysters and 
substitutes for private oysters. Changes in production and 
ex-vessel price of Washington oysters would not affect the 
demand for public oysters, but the demand for private 
oysters would be reduced if the ex-vessel price of 
Washington oysters decreased .
Simulation and Oyster Management
The results of simulation indicated that the OFMP would 
decrease the ex-vessel price but increase the total revenue 
for public ground fishery industry, excepting April and May.
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Since the demand for public oysters was relatively low in 
the late oyster season, this study suggested the possibility 
of extending the closure of oyster seasons from April to 
September. The extended closure of oyster seasons between 
April and May would have little effect on public ground 
fishery. The suggestion was valid only if the objectives of 
the OFMP was achieved.
The simulation results also indicated that the OFMP 
would greatly increase the total revenue for the private 
oyster industry, a move caused by an increase in the demand 
for private oysters and the supply of public oysters. The 
study suggested that the OFMP might provide incentive 
programs to private oyster cultivation. On the other hand, 
if oyster production declined continuously, the total 
revenue for both private oyster cultivation and public 
ground fishery would be reduced.
Pacific oysters were independent of oysters from public 
grounds and were substitutes for oysters from private leased 
grounds. Thus, the study suggested that introducing Pacific 
oysters into Virginia waters would have little effect on 
public oysters but would provide an alternative for private 
planters, a suggestion based on market interaction.
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Conclusions and Future Research
The purposes of this study were to outline the Virginia 
shellstock market for oysters from public and private leased 
grounds and to identify the interrelationships among various 
oyster sources. The study also projected the impacts of the 
OFMP on the Virginia oyster market. Several limitations 
restricted the completeness of the empirical results.
A major limitation was that the model was restricted to 
a market in which only public ground fishery existed.
Closure of the fishing season created a fundamental problem 
for the analysis. All data between June and September were 
omitted so that the estimation could be carried out. 
Fortunately, the results of an additional private model 
suggested that the effect of the seasonal closure on the 
private market sector was small.
A related problem was the inadequate disease indicator 
for representing the threat of diseases. The additional 
private model indicated that the problem of the disease 
index was caused by excluding the June-September season from 
the model, thus underestimating the effect of diseases on 
oyster production.
Another limitation was associated with the limited
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data. Prior to 1986, the monthly price paid for oysters 
from other states was unavailable. Lacking this price 
variable, the outside sector market cannot be completely 
estimated. Furthermore, the estimation might be biased, as 
the variable was excluded. The limitation suggested that 
additional information would be gained by including the 
variable in future research.
The approach was based on market behavior, which 
allowed responses to changes in economic conditions to be 
analyzed. Despite many limitations of the study, the 
approach and related analyses improved the understanding of 
the Virginia oyster market. The approach also provided 
valuable implications for oyster management strategies. 
Finally, and most importantly, the approach provided a 
richness of economic information on the Virginia oyster 
market.
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